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NOTES
"HARM"ING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY: ASSESSING THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN BABBITT V. SWEET HOME
The Court's holding... imposes unfairness to the point of
financial ruin-not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest
farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological
use.
1
Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting.
INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)2 was enacted into law in 1973' to
protect the world's diminishing biological diversity from extinction.4 In the
more than twenty-two years since its passage, the ESA has become regarded
as the most powerful environmental law in the United States.5 It has also
become one of the most contentious as both the use and misuse of the Act
have systematically abrogated the property rights of human beings in the
name of conserving threatened and endangered species and the habitat upon
which they live.6 Perhaps the thorniest issue under the ESA has been
whether the modification of habitat on private lands is punishable under
Section 97 of the Act as a prohibited "taking" of an endangered or threatened
species. In the recently decided case of Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
1. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407,
2421 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 and 1995 Supp.). All cites to the ESA herein will refer
to the 1988 edition of the Code and 1995 Supplement.
3. Amendments were passed in 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1982 and 1988.
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) ("The purposes of this Act are to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved
5. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Strongest U.S. Environmental Law May Become Endangered
Species, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1992, at All. See also Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species
Act and "Takings": A Call for Innovation Within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 356
(1994) ("The ESA is undeniably the most innovative, wide-reaching, and successful environmen-
tal law which has been enacted in the last quarter century.").
6. See, e.g., Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its
Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CuimB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) (explaining how
"constitutionally protected human rights are being relegated to a secondary status behind
legislatively contrived rights for non-human beings").
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
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Communities for a Great Oregon, the United States Supreme Court held that
it is.8
The legal significance of the Court's decision, which is but the latest in
a long history of ESA buck-passing between Congress and the judiciary,9 has
not escaped the attention of Court onlookers." It is a decision which will
have extraordinarily wide-reaching ramifications for both landowners" and
listed species alike as creatures already in danger of extinction are legislative-
ly pitted against the most evolutionarily successful species on earth-Homo
sapiens.'2 Perhaps the most severe consequence of the Court's decision is
8. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407
(1995) (6-3 decision).
9. Noted one reporter, "the high court has declined to do the House and Senate's dirty
work." Robert T. Nelson & Eric Pryne, Ruling Seen Fueling Species-Act Fight, SEATTLE TiMES,
June 30, 1995, at B1. Indeed, as far back as the landmark Supreme Court decision interpreting
the ESA, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), Justice Powell declared that "I
have little doubt that Congress will amend the Endangered Species Act to prevent the grave
consequences made possible by today's decision."Id. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting). After
releasing the Sweet Home decision, Justice Stevens declared from the bench: "We do not sit as
a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto." John H. Cushman, Jr.,
Environmentalists Win a Victory, but Action by Congress May Interrupt the Celebration, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 1995 at A24. Notably, Justice O'Connor left the door open to Congressional
action in her concurring opinion where she wrote, "Congress may, of course, see fit to revisit this
issue." Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. 1407, 1414 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Rep.
Lamar Smith (R-Tx) responded that "[i]f the Supreme Court is not willing to reign in rogue
bureaucrats, Congress will. We will restore common sense to the Act, protecting both private
property and the environment." High Court Upholds Agency Assessment of "Harm" Under
Species Act, INSIDE ENERGY WITH FEDERAL LANDS, July 3, 1995 at 15.
10. See, e.g., James J. Kilpatrick, 5th Amendment takes a beating, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm.,
July 20, 1995, at BIO (commenting that, with the Sweet Home decision "the Supreme Court
performed an astonishing feat of semantic slight-of-hand" as they "squabbled for 52 pages over
the meaning of 'take' in a statute and never said one word about the meaning of 'take' in the
Constitution."). Kilpatrick noted elsewhere that with its opinion, "Justice John Paul Stevens
helped the spotted owl but did the Fifth Amendment no good at all." James J. Kilpatrick, A
Court-ordered Earthquake, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 7, 1995, at A14. Indeed, the ESA's
contravention of the 5th Amendment's prohibition against uncompensated takings was brought
to the Court's attention and argued by one of respondent's amici. See Brief Amicus Curiae of
Pacific Legal Foundation, et al. In support of Respondents, Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct.
2407 (1995) (No. 94-859).
11. Noting that the Sweet Home decision may be the most important environmental ruling
by the high court since the 1970's land use attorney Craig Beam of Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps in San Diego predicted that the decision "is going to result in tremendous uncertainty"
as it'pits landowners against state and federal agencies." Thor K. Biberman, EndangeredSpecies
Ruling Has Strong Local Implications, SAN DIEGO DAILY TR., June 30, 1995 at Al. See alsoJeremy Rabkin, Common Sense v. The Court, TH AMERICAN SPECTATOR, September 1995
(describing the ruling as one which seems to "acknowledge no limits at all to the power of
Congress to commandeer private lands into uncompensated service as wildlife refuges").
12. For an explanation of how the ESA actually thwarts species conservation by encouraging
property owners to surreptitiously destroy listed species, see Mike Vivoli, Shoot, Shovel and Shut
Up, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1992, at Fl. See also Martin Van Der Werf, Endangered Species
Act "Gotta Be Fixed," Foe Says, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 1, 1995 at BI (quoting Chuck Cushman,
executive director of the American Land Rights Association: "A private-property owner is
thinking to himself, 'I find a spotted owl on my property, I'm going to lose everything I've
worked for all my life.' . . . I'll tell you right now, that owl's just never going to show up on
anyone's census.") and Charles C. Mann and Mark L. Plummer, The Butterfly problem;
Government Protection of Endangered Species, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 47, 49-50 (1992).
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the possible end of the ESA itself. As one of the nation's most hotly
contested pieces of environmental legislation, it will almost certainly find
itself kneeling in the crosshairs of a Congressional rifle scope. 3
This Note will critically examine the Court's holding in Babbitt v. Sweet
Home and attempt to cast meaningful light on the legal significance of the
Court's decision, its impacts on private property owners, and its potential
political consequences. Towards that end, Section I will provide readers with
a brief overview of the Act, its purposes, strictures, and enforcement
mechanisms. Section II will describe the evolution of the "harm" definition
involved in Sweet Home, from its initial definition by the Department of the
Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") to its judicial interpretation in
subsequent cases. Section III will trace the tracks of the Sweet Home
plaintiffs from the doors of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to the halls of the United States Supreme Court. Section IV will
examine some of the more significant aspects of the Supreme Court's
holding; both in light of previous environmental caselaw and in terms of its
effects on private landowners. Section V will attempt to predict what
consequences the Court's resolution of this critical issue will have on the
future of the ESA. Finally, this Note will conclude that the ESA is fatally
flawed and must be repealed.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ESA
The ESA was passed in response to Congress' perception that "various
species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered
extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered
by adequate concern and conservation."' 4 In deciding to protect such
species, Congress declared that "these species ... are of aesthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its
people."' 5 It was through the ESA that Congress hoped to enable these
13. See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle, Now Spotted Owl Flies To Pro-Business Congress, NAT'L
L.J., July 10, 1995, at Bi ("The Supreme Court has placed one of the most controversial
environmental issues of the 1990s into the hands of a ready Congress" and quoting William Perry
Pendley of the Denver-based Mountain States Legal Foundation, predicting that the Sweet Home
decision "will mean the end of the Endangered Species Act."). See also Steve LaRue et al.,
Ruling on threatened species may boost preservation here, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., June 30,
at A27 (quoting then-Sen. Bob Packwood, R-Ore. "The Supreme Court has just given those of
us in Congress more incentive to change the act [sic]... so that people count as much as bugs
and birds and plants."). Already, a bill has been proposed which would legislatively overrule the
Court's holding. See H.R. 2275 discussion infra notes 281-302 and accompanying text.
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (1).15. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (3). Yet, as Ike Sugg notes, "these values are asserted, not
demonstrated; nor is any demonstration of such values required to list a species under the ESA."
See Sugg, supra note 6. See also CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE:THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 218 (1995) ("passed in a blind surge of piety, the [ESA]
represents no considered judgment on the worth of the nation's natural heritage, nor a debate on
the means for achieving its protection.").
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species to recover to the point at which the protective provisions of the Act
would no longer be necessary. 6
This recovery was to be facilitated through the proactive process of
identifying potentially imperiled species and listing them as either threat-
ened 7 or endangered" pursuant to Section 4 of the Act.'9 In making his
listing decisions, the Secretary of the Interior" is directed to use the "best
scientific ...data available."'" Once a species is placed on the list, the
Secretary is directed2 to designate its "critical habitat." After being so
designated, the species and the habitat upon which it dwells fall under the
purview of a wide range of land use restrictions designed to protect the
species.24 Enforcement of these restrictions is facilitated through Sections 7
& 9, depending upon the actors involved.2"
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). Thus, the primary goal of the ESA, as manifested in the Act itself,
is to recover and delist species.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (defining "threatened species" as "any species which is likely to
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion
of its range.").
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (defining "endangered species" as "any species which is in danger
of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.").
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
20. Also under § 1533, the Secretary of Commerce is charged with the listing of marine
species.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A). At least one author has pointed out that "[t]his is an absurd
standard. In reality, this means that decisions may be made upon best available data regardless
of quality." Stuart L. Somach, What Outrages Me About the Endangered Secies Act, 24 ENVTL.
L. 801, 806 (1994) (emphasis added). Stomach also dispels the myth that 'staff personnel within
the Fish and Wildlife Service or other relevant agencies are unbiased in their review of listing
petitions. This is not necessarily the case. In too many situations, low-level agency personnel
charged with review and early decisionmaking responsibility in the listing process often belong
to or have affiliations with the very entity that has petitioned for the species listing." Id. at 805.
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2) ("The Secretary shall designate critical habitat, and make
revisions thereto .... ).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (A) (i)&(ii) ("The term 'critical habitat' ... means the specific
areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed ... on which
are found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and
(II) which may require special management considerations or protection." Such habitat even
includes "specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is
listed.., upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation
of the species.").
24. Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, perhaps the most vociferous of the Act's
defenders, admits that "[w]hen a species is listed under the terms of the ESA, there is an
effective freeze across the habitat occupied by that species." Babbitt, supra note 5, at 366.
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Section 7) regulates activities conducted by government agencies and
requires that the actions of such agencies do not jeopardize the continued existence of listed
species. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (Section 9) applies to "any person." As the subject of Sweet Home v.
Babbitt dealt exclusively with the definition of "take" under Section 9, 1 will not expound on the
strictures of Section 7 except to distinguish the two where necessary.
[Vol. 32
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A. Section 9
Section 9 of the ESA26 prohibits a wide range of activities involving
listed species." For instance, this section of the Act makes it illegal for any
person to "possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any means
whatsoever, any such species." '2 Likewise, Section 9 clearly prohibits any
person fTom delivering, receiving, carrying, transporting, or shipping in
interstate or foreign commerce, by any means whatsoever and in the course
of a commercial activity, any such species.29 Yet, while these provisions of
Section 9 clearly identify both the conduct sought to be precluded and the
actors subject to enforcement, other provisions are less clear. For instance,
Section 9 goes on to provide that "it is unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to 'take' any such species within the United
States or the territorial sea of the United States."3 "Take" is defined in the
Act to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."' It was the
legislature's failure to define what constitutes "harm" within the context of
Section 9 that led the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate the regulation
which would eventually find itself at the heart of the Sweet Home controver-
sy.3
2
II. EVOLUTION OF THE ISSUE-DEFINING "HARM"
A. Palila I
The first court to interpret "harm" within the context of Section 9 of the
ESA was the United States District Court of Hawaii in Palila v. Hawaii Dept.
of Land and Natural Resources ("Palla I").33 In that case, certain environ-
mental groups filed an action in the name of the Palila-a six-inch long,
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
27. Id. One commentator describes Section 9 at "perhaps the most powerful piece of wildlife
legislation in the world." Frederico M. Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against
Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a Powerful
Species Preservation Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 109, 111 (1991).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (D).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (E).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B). Such actions are also precluded upon "the high seas." Id.
at 1538(a) (1) (C).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (emphasis added).
32. The original regulation, which was promulgated in 1975, provided that: "'Harm' in the
definition of 'take' in the Act means an act or omission which actually kills or injures wildlife,
including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral
patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering; significant
environmental modification or degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning
of 'harm'." 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,416 (Sept. 26, 1975).
33. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw.
1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Palila I].
1996]
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cone-billed descendant of the Hawaiian honeycreeper bird family-seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department of Land and Natural
Resources of the state of Hawaii. 3' The plaintiffs charged that the
defendants' actions in maintaining destructive populations of feral sheep and
goats in the Palila's critical habitat on the slopes of Mauna Kea in Hawaii
"harmed" the Palila and constituted a "taking" within the meaning of Section
9 of the ESA.35
In assessing their claim, the court began by noting both that the mamane-
naio forest was essential for the Palila's survival, and that the browsing game
animals' feeding habits posed a threat to the continued existence of the
mamane-naio ecosystem. 3' Finding further that the Commerce Clause
provided a valid basis of power for the federal government to regulate the
purely intrastate game involved in the case," the district court looked to the
landmark ESA case of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill38 to discern the
"legislative history and importance of the Act."39  Drawing from the
Supreme Court's conclusion in Hill that both the legislative history40 and the
purposes of the ESA41 supported a broad reading of the Act's prohibitions,
District Judge Samuel P. King concluded that a "taking" of the Palila had
occurred in violation of the ESA.42
In affirming the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals expressly limited its substantive inquiry to whether the Palila was an
endangered species and, if so, whether the defendant's actions had amounted
to a "taking. '43  The court noted: "Any dispute or uncertainty as to the
current population trends of the Palila is immaterial. The relevant inquiry is
34. Id. at 987.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 989-90 ("By consuming seedlings and shoots, the animals prevent regeneration of
the forest, and thus bring about the relentless decline of the Palia's habitat.").
37. Id. at 992. But see Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 on
Private Landowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419, 466 n.232 (1994) ("This reasoning is questionable
because any trade in endangered species, presumably including interstate commerce, is prohibited
expressly by the ESA.").
38. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
39. Palila 1, 471 F. Supp. at 994. Yet this reliance proves poorly founded. Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill was a Section 7 case involving federal agency action, not the purely private activity
that is governed by Section 9.
40. "The legislative proceedings in 1973 are, in fact replete with expressions of concern
over the risk that might lie in the loss of any endangered species." Id. at 994 n.37 (quoting Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 177-78 (1978)).
41. Id. at 994-95 ("Congress has determined that protection of any endangered species
anywhere is of the utmost importance to mankind, and that the major cause of extinction is
destruction of natural habitat.").
42. Id. at 995.
43. Palla v. Hawaii Dept. of Lands & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 496 (1981).
[Vol. 32
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whether the Palila remains an endangered species."44 Finding that the Palila
was indeed "endangered" by the presence of the feral sheep and goats, the
Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the district court.4 5
B. Palila II
Recognizing the severity of the Palila Idecision, the Secretary of Interior
proposed to amend the existing definition of "harm. 46 In proposing the
amendment, the Interior Department Solicitor stated that the Palila I decision
was "inconsistent with the intent of Congress."47 The proposed redefinition
prompted significant protest, with 262 of the 328 comments received
opposing the revision.48 As a result, only a slightly modified definition of
harm was adopted.49
The redefinition had little practical effect. In Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of
Land & Natural Resources ("Palila JI),"O the district court held that the
new definition of harm "remained consistent with the law and regulations in
effect.551
C. Palila III
The Palila reared its beak again in 1984 when the Sierra Club reopened
the issue by moving to amend its original complaint to add mouflon sheep to
the list of destructive animals to be removed from the Palila's habitat.52 The
44. Id One might logically conclude that population trends are entirely relevant in
determining species' status. Indeed, one might even consider them dispositive. But as revealed
by both the court's opinion and the everyday actions of the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),
the agency charged with implementing the Act, such seemingly decisive data are largely, if not
entirely, ignored.
45. Id. ("[D]efendants' action in maintaining feral sheep and goats in the critical habitat is
a violation of the Act since it was shown that the Palila was endangered by the activity.').
46. 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (1981). The Secretary specifically acknowledged that the Paila I
decision motivated his proposal. Id.
47. Id at 29,490. It is interesting to note that the Department of the Interior itself found
the expansive definition of harm inconsistent with the ESA. In his finding, the Solicitor found
that (1) "the term 'harm' should be interpreted to include only those actions that are directed
against, and likely to kill, individual wildlife" and that (2) an earlier version of the bill that
became the ESA contained the more expansive definition but had been "deleted from the final
act." Id
48. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981).
49. The new definition did little to abate the concerns of the Secretary, stating in pertinent
part that "harm" includes "significant habitat modification or degradation vhere it actually kills
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns." 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748
(1981).
50. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 631 F. Supp. 787 (D. Haw. 1985)
[hereinafter Palila II].
51. Id. at 789.
52. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw.
1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Palila 111]. Apparently, the Sierra Club
had not initially included the mouflon sheep because their research into the effects of the sheep
1996]
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district court again ruled in favor of the Sierra Club, finding that the presence
of mouflon sheep "harmed" the Palila within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. §
17.3's definition in two ways. 3 First, the court found that the eating habits
of the sheep destroyed the mamane woodland, causing habitat degradation
that could result in extinction. 4 Second, the court found that if the mouflon
were to continue eating the mamane, the woodland would not regenerate,
precluding the Palila population from recovering to a "point where it could
be removed from the Endangered Species list.""5 Thus, the district court
held that habitat modification was in violation of Section 9 of the ESA if it
"prevents the population from recovering.' 56
In reviewing the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals looked
to the Secretary's 1981 amendment of "harm." ' Noting that the Secretary
had failed to substantially amend the district court's construction of harm in
PaUla I, the appellate court concluded that the actions of the defendants ran
equally afoul of the Secretary's "new" interpretation, which the court found
consistent with the "overall purpose" of the ESA." The court also found
the Secretary's redefinition consistent with the legislative history of the
Act. 9 The court found further support for its decision in the 1982 Amend-
ments to the ESA, finding that Congress' failure to amend the Act indicated
satisfaction with the current definition of harm and its interpretation by the
Secretary and the judiciary." Yet, while the appellate court upheld the
had not yet been completed.
53. Id. at 1074.
54. Id. (emphasis added). Note that the court's use of the word "could" seems to require
no affirmative showing of causation between "habitat degradation" and possible extinction.
55. Id
56. Id. at 1077.
57. Palla III, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988).
58. Id. at 1108 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)). Taken literally, the court's opinion seems to
indicate that the means for achieving the ESA's goals are always permissible so long as the Act's
broad purpose of providing "a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species
and threatened species depend may be conserved" is arguably furthered.
59. For example, the court noted the Act's initial Senate Report which provided that
"'[t]ake' is defined in ... the broadest manner to include every conceivable way in which a
person can 'take' of attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 307, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)). But see Gidari, supra note 37 (explaining that Congress sought to
preempt the ingenuity of men who would intentionally "take" a species rather than unwitting
landowners.). In addition to misreading this legislative excerpt, the court ignored a large body
of legislative history which, taken together, suggest that the ESA was not meant to apply to the
modification of habitat on private lands. For example, the court failed to note that the original
definition of "take" submitted to the Senate Committee on Commerce in the ESA bill included
"destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range" but that the committee expressly
deleted any reference to habitat modification in the final definition.
60, Palla 111, 852 F.2d at 1108. A more persuasive explanation for Congress' failure to act
can be found in Donald J. Barry, Amending the Endangered Species Act, The Ransom of Red
Chief, and Other Related Topics, 21 ENvTL. L. 587 (1991). Barry, formerly an attorney for the
FWS, offers four alternative explanations, in addition to the innate political volatility of the Act,
for the lack of significant ESA reform: (1) A lack of Committee jurisdiction on the part of ESA
reformers; (2) "It is easier to do nothing than it is to do something"; (3) It's better to move no
bill than to move a bad bill; and, (4) "You need a point of leverage to move an immovable
[Vol. 32
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district court's finding that a taking had occurred, they refused to address the
issue of whether "harm" includes habitat degradation that merely retards
recovery.'
III. THE RoAD TO SWEET HOME
Against this backdrop of Section 9 takings "analysis," the northern
spotted owl was listed as a threatened species on June 26, 1990.62 In July
of 1990, Region 1 of the FWS promulgated "informal" guidelines for timber
harvesting and related activities in and around known spotted owl sites6
The FWS's guidelines, dubbed the 70-500-4064 rule, "imposed owl protec-
tion circles on lands covering as much as 9,900 total acres of publicly and
privately owned timberland in the Olympic Peninsula."6  At the then-
current market value of $10,000-$40,000 per acre for timberland, the direct
economic impact of each owl circle exceeded $160,000,000.66
Pursuant to these guidelines, the FWS gave notice that any person
carrying out activities in a manner inconsistent with the guidelines would be
subject to criminal investigation for possible violation of the ESA.67  This
threat also extended to states in their capacity as a licensing agency. In
object." See generally, id. Indeed, each of Barry's explanations seems more persuasive than the
court's and infinitely more so than one observer's baseless interpretation that "[o]nce again,
Congress, faced with clear evidence that the [ESA] could and would have a significant impact,
reaffirmed its commitment to protect species threatened with extinction." Cheever, supra note
27, at 146-47.
61. Palila III, 852 F.2d at 1110. The Ninth Circuit's determination that habitat modification
could constitute "harm" within the meaning of Section 9's "take" prohibition was subsequently
followed by a district court in Texas. In Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex.
1988) aff'd, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991), the court found that the timber management practices
of the U.S. Forest Service in Texas "harmed" the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker by
harvesting the bird's habitat. However, this opinion was bolstered by the court's acknowledgment
that, as a federal agency, the USFS was subject to heightened duties under Section 7 of the ESA.
Id at 1266-68. This confusion by the courts about the respective duties of private citizens and
federal agencies often proves the case as courts generally fail to distinguish between the scopes
of Section 9 and Section 7; particularly when dealing with federal agencies as parties.
62. Endangered and Threatened Wildife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status
for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (June 26, 1990) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §
17.11).
63. Gidari, supra note 37, at 426 (explaining that the Guidelines were "promulgated without
the benefit of public notice, comment, or other rule-making procedures required under the
Administrative Procedures Act" (5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988)); U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Region
1, PROCEDURES LEADING TO ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT COMPLIANCE FOR THE NORTHERN
SPOTTED OWL (July 1, 1990).
64. Gidari, supra note 37, at 427. So named because they required that activities must not
result in less than:
*70 acres of the best available owl habitat encompassing the owl activity center.
*500 acres of suitable habitat within a 0.7-mile radius of a nest site or activity center.
*40% coverage with suitable owl habitat of the entire circle.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 426.
68. Id. at 427 n.15.
1996]
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short, the Sweet Home plaintiffs found themselves impaled on the horns of a
dilemma: either forfeit their property rights outright by following guidelines
mandated in contravention of the APA,69 or face criminal prosecution under
the ESA for developing their land.
A. Sweet Home I
In response to the FWS's illegally-mandated guidelines, a collection of
various small landowners, small logging companies, and families dependent
upon the timber industry filed two lawsuits.7" In Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon v. Lujan ("Sweet Home T'),7 the plaintiffs
challenged two regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior.72
The plaintiffs alleged that 50 C.F.R. Section 17.3, which dealt with the
FWS's definition of "harm," was contrary to the ESA and void for vagueness.
A second regulation, 50 C.F.R. Section 17.31(a), which afforded all
"threatened" species the protections normally reserved for "endangered"
species, was also challenged on the ground that the Secretary was obligated
to make such decisions on a strictly species-by-species basis. The case
was decided on cross-motions for summary judgment.
In charging that Section 17.3 failed to comply with the ESA, the
plaintiffs first pointed out that the original ESA bill, which was referred to
the Senate Committee on Commerce, S. 1983, defined "take" with respect to
fish or wildlife to include "destruction, modification, or curtailment of its
habitat or range." The fact that the bill was reported out of committee
without any reference to habitat modification, plaintiffs argued, showed that
the Senate intended that the scope of the word "take" would not encompass
habitat modification.74
While the court conceded that S. 1983 offered a different definition of
the word "take" than the one that was adopted by the Committee, it noted that
"the other bill [that was before the Senate], S. 1592, defines 'take' exactly as
it now appears in the statute. From this legislative history, the court can
conclude no more than that the Senate chose to adopt the definition in one
bill over that in another. 75 "In fact," the court noted, "the Senate Report
69. See sources cited supra note 63.
70. One of the lawsuits, filed against John Turner, the Director of FWS, was dismissed
under dubious circumstances which suggest conduct on the part of FWS reminiscent of Nixon's
Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP), the group responsible for the Watergate break-in.
See Gidari, supra note 37, at 427-31.
71. 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992), ajd, 1 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd in part, 17 F.3d
1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) [hereinafter Sweet Home 1].
72. Id. at 282.
73. The court quickly rejected this contention, finding that "the plain language of the ESA
clearly grants the Secretary the authority to promulgate regulations such as 17.31(a)." Id. at 286.
74. Id. at 283.
75. Id.
284 [Vol. 32
10
California Western Law Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss2/4
1996] BABBITT V. SWEET HOME
indicates just the opposite, that 'take' was being defined 'in the broadest
possible manner."'76
Plaintiffs next argued that Congress intended to address the problem of
habitat modification exclusively through federal land acquisition, rather than
through the take provision of Section 9.77 The court quickly rejected this
argument, noting that "Congress considered land acquisition a critical tool in
preserving habitat, but they do not suggest that Congress intended it to be the
only tool."78
After finding Section 17.3's definition of "harm" consistent with the
ESA's definition of "take," the court went on to explain that Congress had,
in fact, already acted to lessen the severity of the definition.79 This "relief'
purportedly came in the form of Section 10(a) incidental take permits.8"
The court drew this conclusion, which would later prove important to the
Supreme Court, from a suspect interpretation of Congressman William J.
Tauzin's political bullet-dodging."'
Plaintiffs next maintained that, due to the regulation's unconstitutional
vagueness, they were unable to determine exactly what conduct was
impermissible under the ESA. The court began by noting that plaintiffs'
challenge was facial, requiring them to show that the regulation was
impermissibly vague in all of its applications.8" In rejecting the vagueness
argument, the court held that the definition of 'harm' found in Section 17.3
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis added). The court seems to suggest that Congress should have the option
of paying for species habitat or taking it without compensation. Such a choice in the hands of
a bureaucrat is no choice at all. This mindset allows for what one author has likened to what
Madison referred to as a "tyranny of the majority" as the public's interest in wildlife is furthered
at the expense of individual landowners. See Sugg, supra note 6, at 14.
79. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 284.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 et. seq. Added by amendment in 1982, Section 10 allows the Secretary
to issue permits and exemptions to "take" listed species under certain circumstances.
81. The court's conclusion that Section 10(a) permits were intended to mitigate the severity
of Section 17.3's "harm' definition was based on its interpretation of a hearing before the
Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries reported at 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 291, 329, 331,
343 (1982). There, Ken Berlin of the National Audubon Society and Robert Carlton of the
National Forest Products Association were battling over the "harm" definition before the
committee. The court in Sweet Home I noted that "[riather than argue about statutory
interpretation, Congressman... Tauzin turned the panelists' attention to the exemption process
in Section 10(a) of the ESA, and the discussion subsequently focused on amending that section
to promote its efficiency." Sweet Home , 806 F. Supp. at 284. Noting that "the reauthorization
bill that was eventually adopted by Congress did not amend the original definition of 'take' to
exclude the word 'harm' or to correct the Secretary's definition of that term," the court looked
to the fact that "[i]nstead, it amended the provisions of the Section 10(a) permit process ... "
Id Thus, Tauzin's reluctance to settle a potentially controversial attack against the Act's
impermissible breadth became binding legislative intent. Ironically, Tauzin has since become one
of the ESA's fiercest critics and has sought to limit the Act's applicability to private landowners.
82. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 285. As Gidari has pointed out, "[g]iven the express
threats in the Guidelines, one wonders why the [as applied] allegations were not made." Gidari,
supra note 37, at 491 n.373.
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clearly limited prohibited conduct, including habitat modification, to that
which "actually kills or injures wildlife."83 Finding further that a conviction
under the ESA required the government to show that a defendant had
knowledge of the violation, the court refused to find the regulation
impermissibly vague and found for the Secretary."
B. Sweet Home II
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Mikva
wrote the opinion for the court affirming the district court's decision and
finding that the "challenged regulations are reasonable interpretations of the
ESA."85 The court also affirmed the lower court's determination that the
regulation was not void for vagueness.86
Though the Sweet Home plaintiffs had alleged that the regulation's
vagueness left them vulnerable to the "whims and predictions of biologists to
determine when a habitat modification is 'significant' and when such
modification 'significantly impairs behavioral patterns,"'87 the court respond-
ed by pointing out that theirs was a facial challenge.88 As such, the court
found that plaintiffs were not entitled to have the regulation "wiped off the
books... merely by showing that it will be impermissibly vague in the
context of some hypothetical application."89
Turning to Section 17.3, the court found that "there are obviously types
of activity, including habitat modification, that [the regulation] clearly
prohibits without a hint of vagueness."90 "For example," the court contin-
83. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 286.
84. Id. But, as Gidari has pointed out, the court fundamentally misunderstood the knowledge
requirement of Section 9 prosecutions. See Gidari, supra note 37, at 491 n.376. To prosecute
a Section 9 case, the government need only prove that the party knowingly committed the act
at issue, not that it was illegal under the ESA. Such a lessened standard of intent is not
uncommon with environmental laws, which have been held to be public welfare statutes. See,
e.g., United States v. Hayes Intern. Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (1 1th Cir. 1986). In fact, courts
have upheld criminal convictions based upon strict liability in two cases under the Federal Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); U.S. v. Park, 421
U.S. 658 (1975). Thus, the precise circumstance which the court denies as possible, specifically,
a prosecution for unknowing violation of the ESA, is not only possible, but entirely likely under
the ESA. See, e.g., United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044 (D.C. Mont. 1988) (holding
that, to prosecute a defendant under Section 9, the government need not prove that defendant
knew he was shooting a protected grizzly bear at the time he pulled the trigger).
85. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, I F.3d 1, 2 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (hereinafter Sweet Home II).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 4. Indeed, Charles C. Mann and Mark L. Plummer have explained, "Invariably
the choices [of scientists] will be arbitrary, because scientists have no claim to represent the
values of other people." MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 15, at 207.
88. Sweet Home 11, 1 F.3d at 4.
89. Id. (citing Village of Hoffinan Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
495 (1982)). Rather, the court was required to uphold the challenge only if the law was shown
to be impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Id. at 4.
90. Sweet Home I, I F.3d at 4-5.
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ued, "it obviously forbids the very sort of conduct that appellants argue it
should be limited to-habitat modification that causes ascertainable physical
injury or death to an individual member of a listed species."'" Thus, the
court found that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the regulation's facial
invalidity.92 Moreover, the court found that the "knowledge requirement"
of the ESA further vitiated plaintiffs' challenge, declaring that a "scienter
requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the
adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is prescribed."93
Turning to Section 17.31(a)'s expansion of Section 9 prohibitions, the
court justified the extension as supported by the Act's structure and purpose.
Moreover, the court refused to challenge an apparently broad and potentially
unconstitutional delegation to the Secretary of the Interior, hiding instead
behind the "substantial deference" principles of Chevron USA, Inc. v.
NRDC.
94
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sentelle observed that "some will find
ambiguity even in a 'No Smoking' sign."95 While conceding that Congress'
intent was ambiguous as to the proper definition of "harm," Judge Sentelle
remarked that he could not "cram the agency's huge regulatory definition into
the tiny crack of ambiguity that Congress left."96 Rather, he urged obser-
vance of the ancient principle of statutory construction known as noscitur a
sociis, giving general words in a list narrow interpretation to avoid giving
"unintended breadth" to the Acts of Congress.97 The standoff between
91. Id. at 5. The court completely ignores that plaintiffs had been threatened with criminal
prosecution for refusing to follow FWS guidelines irrespective of any tangible injuries to listed
species!
92. Id. Indeed, the court cautioned that "[a]ppropriate judicial restraint obligates us to wait
for specific applications of the regulation to arise, for, . .. the government may in the meantime
take further steps that will sufficiently narrow potentially vague or arbitrary interpretations of the
regulation." Id. One wonders how Mikva could realistically believe that FWS would remedy their
interpretation considering that the duplicitous actions of the FWS revealed little intent to act in
good faith, let alone remedy an obviously over-broad interpretation.
93. Sweet Home HI, I F.3d at 4 (quoting Flipside, 455 U.S. at 499). But see supra note 84
(explaining the court's misunderstanding of the knowledge requirement under the ESA).
94. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron principle holds that, where an agency has interpreted
ambiguous Congressional intent, courts will defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it is
a "permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. Mikva wrote an entire separate concurring
opinion explaining how his refusal to set aside the "harm" regulation comported with the
Chevron principle. Sweet Home I, I F.3d at 8-11.
95. Sweet Home 11, 1 F.3d at I I (citing International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and
Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. General Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1575
(D.C. Cir. 1987)). Sentelle went on to posit that "in the present case, the [FWS] has established
that it would . . . deem Congressional authorization for the erection of 'No Smoking' signs to
authorize the adoption of regulations against chewing and spitting [tobacco]." Id.
96. Id. at 12.
97. Id. (citing Mikva Op. at 4). Under this principle, Judge Sentelle concluded that "it
appears to me that the Fish and Wildlife Service has engaged in. .. [an] unreasonable expansion
of terms in the present case." Id. Sentelle also rejected the agency's interpretation because to
read Section 9 so broadly would be to render Section 7, which applies to federal actors, "surplus-
age." d
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Mikva and Sentelle was broken by Judge Williams, who concurred with
Mikva because of the 1982 amendments.9"
C. Sweet Home III
After granting plaintiffs' petition for rehearing, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, in part, its prior decision in Sweet Home 1. In an opinion
by Judge Williams, the court held that the FWS's definition of "harm" was
not a permissible interpretation of Congressional intent.99 Rather, the court
found that the Service's definition was "neither clearly authorized by
Congress nor a 'reasonable interpretation' of the statute." '
The court began by noting that the FWS had found habitat modification
within the word "harm," which the court described as "the most elastic of the
words Congress used to define the acts that Section 9 of the ESA forbids
private individuals to commit."'O' However, in limiting the breadth of
"harm," the court quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Councill0 2 for the proposition that "the distinction
between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulations is often in the
eye of the beholder."' 3 Thus, although the court conceded that a farmer
who harvests crops or trees on which a species depends might technically
"harm" the species if the benefits withdrawn were important to the species,
the court found that the "immediate context of the word" argued against such
a broad reading." 4
98. Sweet Home 11, I F.3d at 11 ("But for the 1982 amendments, I would find Judge
Sentelle's analysis highly persuasive-including his discussion of the noscitur a sociis canon.").
99. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463,
1464 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (hereinafter Sweet Home III).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1464. Indeed, the apparent incongruency of interpreting harm in such a way has
not escaped the attention of at least one ESA expert, who notes that "the take prohibition is often
a clumsy tool for habitat protection. Of the components in the statutory definition of take, only
the term 'harm' does not expressly convey the notion of direct application of physical force or
effect." J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws
Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. COLo. L. R~v.
555, 586-587 (1995).
102. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
103. Sweet Home 111, 17 F.3d at 1464. Williams went on to explain that "[i]n one sense of
the word, we 'harm' the people of Somalia to the extent that we refrain from providing
humanitarian aid, and we harm the people of Bosnia to the extent that we fail to stop 'ethnic
cleansing.' By the same token, it is linguistically possible to read 'harm' as referring to a
landowner's withholding of the benefits of a habitat that is beneficial to a species." See also
David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or
Compensation for Lost Expectations?, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 308 (1995) ("Landowners
can be ordered to prevent harm, but not to provide benefits. Benefits must be paid for.").
104. Sweet Home 111, 17 F.3d at 1465. Within this context, the court noted that "[w]ith the
single exception of the word 'harm,' the words of the [Section 9] definition contemplate the
perpetrator's direct application of force against the animal taken." Id. at 1465 ("Harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.., fir, in ordinary language, the basic
model 'A hit B."').
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In support of its position that "harm" should be interpreted narrowly,
with attention given to the nature of the surrounding prohibited acts, the court
cited a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case which sought to interpret "harass"
within the context of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (M IPA)."'0 In
that case, the Ninth Circuit Court applied noscitur a sociis to the word
"harass" as it appeared in the statute along with "hunt, capture and kill" as
prohibited "takings" of protected marine mammals. For the defendant in
Hayashi to be convicted under the MMPA for "harassing" protected
porpoises, the court ruled that his acts must amount to the same types of
sustained and significant intrusions upon a marine mammal that accompanied
the other prohibited acts."06
With the Ninth Circuit Court's Hayashi decision in mind, the Sweet
Home court turned to the ESA, finding that the nine verbs accompanying
"harm" in the ESA's "take" definition all involved a substantially direct
application of force, which the FWS' concept of forbidden habitat modifica-
tion lacked. 107 Moreover, the court found that the practical implications of
the Service's definition suggested its improbable relation to congressional
intent.10
8
In addition to the strict construction principles of noscitur a sociis, the
D.C. Circuit Court found further support for its holding in both the structure
and history of the ESA. After examining the structure of the Act, the court
concluded that the ESA's conservation purposes were intended to be carried
out through three basic mechanisms: (1) a federal land acquisition program
set up by Section 5109 of the ESA; (2) the imposition of strict obligations
on federal agencies to avoid adverse impacts on endangered species, as set
out in Section 7" 0 of the Act; and (3) a prohibition on the deliberate taking
of endangered species by anybody, as embodied in Section 9."'
105. Id. at 1465 (citing United States v. Hayashi, 5 F.3d 178, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993).
106. United States v. Hayashi, 5 F.3d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit Court
found that the defendant, who had fired a rifle twice into the water behind some porpoises, had
not harassed the porpoises within the meaning of the statute because his actions were not "direct
and significant intrusions upon the mammal's ordinary activities." Id.
107. Sweet Home 111, 17 F.3d at 1465.
108. Id. In explaining these implications, the court noted that:
Species dependency may be very broad. One adherent of aggressive protection, for
instance, notes that 'some scientists believe that as many as 35 million to 42 million
acres of land are necessary to the survival of grizzlies,' about as much land in the
northern Rockies of the United States and Canada as is still usable grizzly habitat.
Id (citing ROCKY BARKER, SAVING ALL THE PARTS 34 (1993). Taking this figure into account,
and noting that the Act provides for criminal penalties of up to a $100,000 fine and imprisonment
for one year for each violation, the court concluded that the impact of the Service's concept of
"harm" and its resulting extinction of private rights "counsel application of the maxim noscitur
a sociis." Id.
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1535.
110. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
19961
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The court found further support for its conclusion that "harm" was not
intended to include habitat modification in the legislative history of the
Act." 2 For example, the court cited the explanation of the land acquisition
program given by Senator Tunney, then Senate floor manager for the
ESA. 3 Acknowledging that the principal threat to animals stems from the
destruction of their habitat, Senator Tunney explained that "[t]hrough these
land acquisition provisions, we will be able to conserve habitats necessary to
protect fish and wildlife from further destruction.""..4 Further bolstering the
position that the land acquisition was to be the sole method of protecting
species threatened by the indirect acts of private landowners, the court cited
a statement by then-floor manager for the House version of the ESA bill
Representative Sullivan." 5 Noting that the destruction of habitat may be
intentional or unintentional, Rep. Sullivan stated that "the result is unfortunate
for the species of animals that depend on that habitat.""' 6 Rep. Sullivan
went on to explain that "H.R. 37 will meet this problem by providing funds
for acquisition of critical habitat through the use of the land and water
conservation fund.""'
17
In addition to these compelling statements by the legislators responsible
for shaping and enacting the ESA, the court referred to the Congress'
deliberate deletion of habitat modification from the definition of "take" as
further strengthening its conclusion."' So, while the district court in Sweet
Home I refused to "speculate as to Congress' intent" in deleting the
definition," 9 Judge Williams remained "mindful that Congress had before
it, but failed to pass, just such a scheme."' 20
The court then turned to the 1982 amendments of the ESA that Judge
Williams had found so persuasive in Sweet Home I. Upon further reflection,
he found that the 1982 amendments entailed two possible implications which
would support a broad interpretation of harm; either that the amendments so
altered the context of the definition of "take" as to render the Service's
definition reasonable, or, that the process of amendment, in which the
agency's interpretation of "harm" and a judicial enforcement thereof came to
112. Sweet Home I1, 17 F.3d at 1466.
113. Id.
114. Id, (quoting Statement of Senator Tunney, 119 CONG. REC. 25669 (July 24, 1973)).
115. Id. at 1466.
116. Id, (quoting a statement by Representative Sullivan, floor manager for H.R. 37, 119
CONG. REc. 30162 (Sept. 18, 1973)).
117. Id. Sullivan further explained that this "land and water conservation fund" would
enable the government to "cooperate with willing landowners who desire to assist in the
protection of endangered species, but who are understandably unwilling to do so at excessive cost
to themselves." Id. (emphasis added)
118. Id. at 1467.
119. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. 279, 283 (D.D.C. 1992).
120. Sweet Home 111, 17 F.3d at 1467 (citing John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris
Trust Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993) for the proposition that courts must give meaning to
Congress' failure to act when appropriate).
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the attention of the congressional subcommittee, constituted a ratification of
the regulation.' After considering each, the court rejected both theo-
ries. 122
As for the proposition that the Congress' amendment in 1982 brought the
Secretary's interpretation into the realm of reasonability, the court noted that
the only legislative act from which the government claimed support was the
addition of the Section 10(a) incidental take permits.' 2 1 In rejecting this
contention, the court noted that the language clearly implied that some
prohibited takings are 'incidental' to otherwise lawful activities but that it did
not necessarily follow that such incidental takings included the habitat
modifications embraced by the Service's definition. 24
In rejecting the ratification argument, the court conceded that the
committee in charge of amending the Act was aware that the FWS' definition
of "harm" had been given judicial approval in the Palila cases. However, the
court noted that "[s]o far as appears, no congressional awareness of the
Service's regulation or of Palila reached the floor of either House."'25 So,
after rejecting each of the government's arguments in favor of the agency's
interpretation, the court held the regulation invalid, concluding that "on a
specific segment of society, the federal government, the Act imposes very
broad burdens (through Section 7), including the avoidance of adverse habitat
modifications. 12' 6  As for the more broad segment of society, "it imposes
relatively narrow ones,' ' 2 7 prohibiting only direct actions against listed
species.
While Judge Sentelle was "most pleased to concur in the decision of the
court" and did so "with enthusiasm, 12 1 Judge Mikva was less than enthused
with the court's departure from his earlier opinion. In a strong dissent,
Mikva cautioned that the "majority's decision in this case is unfortunate. It
scuttles a carefully conceived Fish and Wildlife Service regulation and creates
121. Id. at 1467.
122. Id.
123. Id. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (B) provides that the "Secretary may permit, under such terms
and conditions as he shall prescribe any taking otherwise prohibited by [Section 9] of this title
if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful
activity." 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(B).
124. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1467. The Supreme Court would later disagree, concluding
that it does necessarily follow.
125. Id. at 1469. Similarly, the court refused to imply ratification from Senator Gain's act
of withdrawing a potential amendment of the Service's definition, or from language contained
in the Conference Reports on the 1982 amendments. Id.
126. Id. at 1466. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) provides, in relevant part, that "[e]ach Federal
agency shall ... insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency... is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.... ." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2) (emphasis added).
127. Sweet Home III, 17 P.3d at 1466.
128. Id. at 1472 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
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a split in the circuits on an important statutory question.' 29 To Mikva, the
court should have upheld the Service's regulation under the agency deferential
standard laid out in Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.3' Since the burden, under Chevron, is on the private party
to prove that the agency's interpretation of a statute is impermissible rather
than on the agency to defend its interpretation, Mikva would have upheld the
regulation. On a subsequent petition for rehearing and suggestion for
rehearing en banc to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Mikva joined with
Circuit Judges Wald, Silberman and Rogers in dissent as the court denied the
government's petition.' On January 6, 1995, the United States Supreme
Court granted the government's petition for certiorari.
13 2
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
After the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the Secretary of the
Interior's regulatory definition of "harm" as an impermissible construction of
the ESA, one critic openly queried whether the decision should not be viewed
as a victory for private property owners, especially in light of the court's
reference to a possible "extinction of private rights" and its favorable citing
of Lucas v. South Carolina Council."' Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court's
final decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon34 should just as surely be viewed as a defeat for those same private
land owners, particularly since the Court's opinion was drafted by Justice
John Paul Stevens,'35 a Lucas dissenter.'36
129. Id. at 1473 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the court's departure from the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions in the Palia cases).
130. 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). Under the Chevron standard, where the intent of
Congress is ambiguous and an agency's interpretation is challenged, a court is obligated to
uphold the agency's interpretation so long as that interpretation is a permissible construction of
the statute. Id.
131. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
132. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. 714
(1995).
133. See Gidari, supra note 37, at 496 n.397.
134. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
135. Notably, Stevens was on the bench and played an important role on the Court when
the landmark ESA case, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), was decided.
Arguing that case for the government before the Court was Griffin Bell, attorney general for the
Carter administration. As recounted in MANN & PLUMMER,
A big man with a raspy, deeply southern voice, Bell interrupted his oral argument to
withdraw a test tube from his jacket pocket. "I have in my hand a darter," he
proclaimed, 'a snail darter.' The snail darter, a freshwater fish no bigger than a human
thumb, had been placed on the endangered species list three years before; the case
involved a dam that would destroy its only known habitat. Bell handed the fish to the
bench. The test tube made its way along the line of nine justices, each of whom
solemnly peered at its contents before passing it to a neighbor. Stopping a dam that
would provide thousands of jobs for the sake of this insignificant fish? Ridiculous!
The attorney general stood back, satisfied, as laughter filled the court. The laughter
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In reversing the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held
6-3 that the Secretary of the Interior had reasonably construed Congress'
intent when he defined "harm" to include habitat modification. After
reviewing the pertinent case history, the majority cited three reasons for
preferring the Secretary's interpretation. First, the Court found that the
ordinary meaning of "harm" naturally encompasses habitat modification that
results in actual injury or death to members of an endangered or threatened
species.'37 Citing the Webster's definition of "harm" as meaning "to cause
hurt or damage to; injure," the Court concluded that unless "harm" encom-
passed indirect as well as direct injuries, the word would be deprived of
independent meaning. 3 ' As for respondents' claim that the Secretary
should have limited the purview of "harm" to direct applications of force
against a listed species, the Court pointed out that the dictionary definition
does not include the word "directly" or suggest in any way that only direct
or willful action that leads to injury constitutes "harm."' 39  Moreover, the
Court found support for its interpretation in several other words included in
the Act's definition of "take," such as "harass," "pursue" and "wound," which
the Court found no more out of place than "habitat modification."' 40
Second, the Court found that the ESA's broad purpose of providing "a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved" supported the Secretary's decision to
extend Section 9's prohibitions against "activities that cause the precise harms
was halted by the quiet voice of Justice John Paul Stevens. 'Mr. Attorney General,'
he said, 'your exhibit makes me wonder. Does the Government take the position that
some endangered species are entitled to more protection than others?' Bell's smile
disappeared... [he] had no answer.
MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 15, at 147-48.
Stevens' question, and more particularly its timing, are deeply revealing of the sympathy Stevens
has for the purpose of the ESA. It also reveals at least a partial acceptance on his part that all
species, both the "warm fuzzys" and the "creepy crawlies" merit protection.
136. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In his Lucas dissent, Stevens urged the Court to give states more flexibility to "revise
the rights and uses of property" in order to implement their "new learning" which, according to
Stevens, is a natural byproduct of the human condition which is in a state of "constant learning
and evolution." Stevens' willingness to allow states such power to "revise rights" suggests that
he has too little distrust for the inherent nature of government to repress such liberties. For an
excellent criticism of Stevens' willingness to "unglue the common law," as evinced in his Lucas
dissent, see Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 955, 975-978 (1993).
137. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2412-13.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2413. Indeed, the Court replied that such an implied limitation "ill serves the
statutory text, which forbids not taking 'some creatures' but 'taking any endangered species'-a
formidable task for even the most rapacious feudal lord." Id.
140. Id. at 2413 n.10.
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Congress enacted the statute to avoid."'' In support of this conclusion, the
Court noted that while previous efforts to conserve endangered species had
not contained any sweeping prohibition against the taking of endangered
species except on federal lands, the ESA was intended to apply to "all land
in the United States and to the Nation's territorial seas."' 42 The Court again
harkened back to its decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,'43 where
it held that "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt
and reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost."'44
Lastly, the Court found that the 1982 amendments, which authorized the
Secretary to issue permits for takings that Section 9 would otherwise prohibit
so long as "such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying
out of an otherwise lawful activity," strongly suggested that Congress
understood Section 9's prohibitions to encompass indirect as well as
deliberate takings.' 45 Since the Section 10(a) permit process requires the
applicant to prepare a "habitat conservation plan," which specifies how the
applicant plans to "minimize and mitigate" the impact of his activity on
endangered and threatened species, 4 6 the Court found further that "Con-
gress had in mind foreseeable rather than merely accidental effects on listed
species.' 47
The Court then turned to the Court of Appeals' decision, pointing out
what the Supreme Court identified as their three errors in asserting that
'harm' must refer to a direct application of force because the words
141. Id. at 2413 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)). But see id. at 2426 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("I
thought we had renounced the vice of 'simplistically assuming that whatever furthers the statute's
primary objective must be the law."' (citing Rodriquez v. United States 480 U.S. 522, 526
(1987)).
142. Id.
143. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
144. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2413 (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 473 U.S.
153, 184 (1978) (emphasis added)). Note the Court's failure to address the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals decision in Sweet Home III, which finally distinguished between the very broad
burdens (under Section 7) placed upon the federal government by the ESA, and the "relatively
narrow ones" placed upon the citizenry (under Section 9). Sweet Home 111, 17 F.3d 1463, 1466(D.C. Cir. 1994). As to this distinction, the Supreme Court in its decision merely conceded that
"[a]lthough the Section 9 "take" prohibition was not at issue in Hill, we took note of that
prohibition, placing particular emphasis on the Secretary's inclusion of habitat modification in
his definition of 'harm."' Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2413. But see id. at 2426 n.3. (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (explaining, at long last, that "[e]ven if we had said that the Secretary's regulation
was authorized by [Section 9], that would have been utter dictum, for the only provision at issue
was [Section 7]. But in fact we simply opined on the effect of the regulation while assuming its
validity, just as courts always do with provisions of law whose validity is not at issue." (emphasis
added)).
145. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2414 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1) (B)).
146. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2) (A).
147. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2414. The Court went on to declare that "[n]o one could
seriously request an 'incidental' take permit to avert Section 9 liability for direct, deliberate
action against a member of an endangered or threatened species, but respondents would read
'harm' so narrowly that the permit procedure would have little more than that absurd purpose."
Id.
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surrounding it did. 4 First, the Court explained, the Court of Appeals'
premise was flawed in assuming that the direct application of force was
implicated by the nine terms which constitute "take." In fact, the Court
noted, "several of the words that accompany 'harm' in the Section 3
definition of 'take,' 4 9 especially 'harass,' 'pursue,' 'wound,' and 'kill' refer
to actions or effects that do not require direct applications of force."'50
Thus, the Court reasoned, the Court of Appeals erred when it imputed such
a meaning to "harm" as it exists in the statute.
Second, the Supreme Court pointed out that, to the extent that the Court
of Appeals read a requirement of intent or purpose into the words used to
define "take," the lower court failed to observe Section 9's express provision
that a "knowing" action is enough to violate the Act."' In light of the
"knowing" action provision, which dramatically lowers the intent requirement
of Section 9, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in
presuming a higher required showing of intent.'52
Finally, the Court pointed to the D.C. District Court of Appeals'
misapplication of the noscitur a sociis cannon in interpreting "harm." Noting
that the cannon counsels that a word "gathers meaning from the words around
it,"'53 the Court pointed out that the appellate court actually misused the
cannon to limit "harm" to essentially the same function of surrounding words,
denying it independent meaning.'54 In fact, the Court explained, the
statutory context of "harm" suggested that Congress meant the term to serve
a particular and distinct function under the ESA, which the appellate court
had undercut with its decision. For these three reasons, the Supreme Court
dismissed the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Sweet Home II as
clear error.
The Court next turned to other arguments offered by the landowners. To
their argument that, under the Secretary's interpretation of"harm," the federal
government lacks any incentive to purchase land under the land acquisition
provision of Section 5 of the Act,'55 the Court responded that purchasing
habitat lands "may well cost the Government less in many circumstances than
148. Id. at 2415.
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
150. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2445.
151. Id.
152. Note that the Supreme Court uses the ESA's egregiously low knowledge requirement
to actually defend the Act from judicial attack.
153. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303,
307 (1961)).
154. Id. The Court also pointed out that the respondents were wrong to place reliance on
United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1993), which involved a statute whose "take"
definition included neither "harm" nor other words which appear in the ESA definition.
Moreover, the Court noted, Hayashi was decided by the very court that heard the Palila case,
yet in deciding the Hayashi case, neither the majority or the dissent of the Ninth Circuit Court
saw any need to "distinguish or even cite Palila 1." Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2415 n.16.
155. 16 U.S.C. § 1534.
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pursuing civil or criminal penalties."' 6 Moreover, the Court noted that
only through the proactive process of Section 5 habitat acquisition could the
government avoid harm to listed species, while Section 9 cannot be utilized
until after a protected species has been killed or injured.'57
Next, the landowners argued that Section 7's express prohibition against
habitat modification' 8 demonstrated that Congress was aware of the habitat
problem but intentionally left any such provision out of Section 9 because it
did not intend for private citizens to be liable for such actions. In response,
the Court noted that the Section 7 duty simply "imposes a broad, affirmative
duty to avoid adverse habitat modifications that Section 9 does not replicate"
and that "Section 7 does not limit its admonition to habitat modification that
'actually kills or injures wildlife."" 59 Moreover, the Court pointed out that
Section 7 contained other limitations that Section 9 does not, but that "any
overlap that Section 5 or Section 7 may have with Section 9 in particular
cases is unexceptional and simply reflects the broad purpose of the Act.' 60
Thus, the ESA's failure to even mention adverse habitat modification in
Section 9 while expressly including such a prohibition in Section 7 was
ultimately dismissed as inconsequential.
In addition to its earlier enunciated reasons, the Court found support for
the Secretary's interpretation of "harm" in the legislative history of the Act.
For example, the Court noted that the Committee Reports accompanying the
bills that would become the ESA made it clear that Congress intended "take"
to apply as broadly as possible, to include indirect as well as purposeful
actions."" The Court found particular significance in a statement by then-
floor manager of the Senate ESA bill Senator Tunney, who upon offering
"harm" to the definition of "take," remarked that the amendment, along with
others, would "help to achieve the purposes of the bill."' 62
156. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2415. Note that this statement implies that, among other
things, the government actually takes cost into account; a premise which would appear
fundamentally inconsistent with the current state of the budget! Moreover, no less than the
director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, Mollie Beattie, appears to have had 
no idea that Section
5 of the Act even existed, much less that it offers a constitutional method of habitat conservation.Urging the importance of upholding the Secretary's "harm" regulation before the Court's decision
was handed down, Ms. Beattie asked "How can vwe conserve endangered species without having
a way to conserve habitat?" Linda Kanamine & Tony Mauro, Courtwise: Spotted Owls vs.
Landowners, USA TODAY, April 17, 1995, at 3A (quoting Beattie). With such a high ranking
FWS official obviously oblivious to even the existence of Section 5, the Court's contention that
FWS might choose it in the interest of efficiency is, at best, disingenuous.
157. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2415. Note, too, that this statement implies that the
government cares more about species than it does about money; a similarly doubtful premise.
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (4).
159. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2415-16.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2416 (1995) (citing S. REP. No. 93-307, p. 7 (1973), which provided that
"'[t]ake' is defined... in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in
which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife.").
162. ld at 2416-17 (citing 119 CONG. REC. 25683 (July 24, 1973)).
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To respondents' argument that the lack of debate about the amendment
that added "harm" should counsel a narrow reading of the term, the Court
simply replied that "[w]e disagree."' 63 Similarly, when respondents pointed
out that the definition of "take," which originally appeared in S. 1983, was
deleted by the Senate prior to passage, the Court responded "[w]e do not find
that fact especially significant."'64
In a separate, concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
majority's opinion for two reasons. First, she based her opinion on the
understanding that the challenged regulation was limited to significant habitat
modification that caused actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative,
death or injury to identifiable listed species.'65
163. Id. at 2417 ("An obviously broad word that the Senate went out of its way to add to
an important statutory definition is precisely the sort of provision that deserves a respectful
reading.").
164. Id, Yet, in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), where the Court
(Stevens included) sought to decipher Congressional intent in passing Section 7 of the ESA, the
Court noted that:
this provision had its genesis in the Endangered Species Act of 1966, but that
legislation qualified the obligation of federal agencies by stating that they should seek
to preserve endangered species only 'insofar as is practicable and consistent with their
primary purposes.. . .' Likewise, every bill introduced in 1973 contained a
qualification similar to that found in the earlier statutes .... What is significant in this
sequence is that the final version of the 1973 Act carefully omitted all of the reserva-
tions described above.
Id. at 181-82 (emphasis added).
Thus, while the Court in 1978 found Congressional omission of a phrase to be "very significant,"
the Court in 1995 refused acknowledge an express refusal by Congress to include habitat
modification within the definition of take.
165. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2418 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor's "understand-
ing" is based largely upon the representations of the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) that the
challenged regulation is "limited" to such habitat modifications in practice. Yet, as Gidari has
pointed out, under the FWS administered ESA landowners are routinely threatened with criminal
prosecution for "causing" precisely the "speculative" injuries of which O'Connor expressly
disapproves. Gidari, supra note 37, at 427-31. These threatened prosecutions rarely specity any
actual injury to a listed species. See, e.g., Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and
Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21
ENVTL. L. 605, 613-614 (1991) (quoting a "typical letter from [Gail Kobetich, Field Supervisor
of the Sacramento branch of] the FWS to [Peter Chamberlin, director of the Sand City Planning
Commission, who] . . . proposed to zone property for development within the habitat of an
endangered species": "Section 9 of the [ESA] ... makes it unlawful for any person to take an
endangered species without a permit .... Section I I of the Act prescribes civil penalties of up
to $10,000... or imprisonment for up to one year, or both, for knowingly violating any
provision of the [ESA]. .. . [W]e must advise you, unless you first secure a section 10(a) permit
authorizing the incidental take ... the approval and implementation of the proposed action may
subject... city officials to investigations by our law enforcement branch regarding potential
violations of the [ESA].").
23
Vivoli: "Harm"ing Individual Liberty: Assessing the U.S. Supreme Court's
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Secondly, O'Connor observed that "even setting aside difficult questions of
scienter, the regulation's application is limited by ordinary principles of
proximate causation, which introduce notions of foreseeability."',
A. Scalia's Dissent
In a fervent dissent characteristic of his traditional regard for individual
liberty, 67 Justice Scalia denounced the Court's decision, which, in his view,
"imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin-not just upon the rich, but
upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological
use."'68  To Scalia, it was "unmistakably clear" that the ESA, as it was
meant to apply to private landowners, merely forbade the hunting and killing
of endangered animals and provided federal lands and federal funds for the
acquisition of private lands to preserve the habitat of endangered species.'69
Scalia began his dissent by detailing three features of the challenged
regulation which, in his view, failed to comport with the ESA. 70 First, he
attacked the Court's interpretation of the statute as prohibiting habitat
modification which constitutes no more than a cause-in-fact of death or injury
to a listed species, irrespective of whether the resulting injury was intended
or even foreseeable.' Next, Scalia noted that as interpreted by the majori-
166. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2418. But see Defenders of Wildlife v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 688 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part, 882 F.2d
1294 (8th Cir. 1989). In a case which demonstrates the extreme end of the causation spectrum
under Section 9 of the ESA, plaintiffs alleged that the EPA's continued registration of strychnine
constituted an impermissible taking of protected species in violation of Section 9 of the ESA and
other wildlife statutes. Without even addressing the chain of causation between the registration
of strychnine and the ultimate death of any listed species (indeed, plaintiffs introduced no
evidence of such a connection), both the district court and court of appeals agreed that a "taking"
had occurred within the meaning of Section 9. Id. at 1301. In light of the court's holding in
Defenders v. EPA, it would appear that O'Connor's confidence that "ordinary principles of
proximate causation" would apply to Section 9 is misplaced since no such requirement was
necessary to find a "take" in that case. Perhaps her decision can be best understood in light of
O'Connor's position on environmental laws in general, which one commentator describes as
"much more sympathetic to the goals of environmental laws, although... [she is] still concerned
about the potential for abuse." Lavelle, supra note 13, at BI (quoting Prof. Richard Lazarus of
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis). Note, however, that Justice O'Connor did
express her disapproval with the Palla i1 decision as an impermissible breach of the regulation's
causational limitations. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
167. For an excellent account of Scalia's regard for individual liberty, specifically with
regard to his respect for property rights, see generally Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1433 (1993).
168. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id. Indeed, Scalia makes a compelling and well documented case for such an
interpretation. Id. at 2422-26.
170. Id. at 2421.
171. Id. Notably, Scalia singled out the result in Palia II as an illustration of the definition's
practical absurdity; arguing that the virtual absence of a chain of causality between modification
and injury alone rendered the regulation invalid. Id at 2421-22.
[Vol. 32
24
California Western Law Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss2/4
1996] BABBITT V. SWEET HOME 299
ty, a violation of the challenged regulation, and thus the ESA, did not even
require an "act" which harms a listed species; an omission would suffice.172
The third failure of the challenged regulation to comport with the ESA
that Scalia identified was the fact that under 50 CFR Section 17.3's definition
of "harm," "significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding" was in violation of the ESA.'73 Since such impairment does not
"irijure" currently living creatures, but merely prevents such species from
propagating, Scalia saw the regulation as stretching the definition of "take"
to an impermissible breadth to protect not only individual species, butffuture
populations of species as well; a goal not attainable through Section 9.174
As for each of these inconsistencies, Scalia found the challenged
regulation all the more conspicuous when contrasted .against the traditional
definition of "take" as historically applied to wildlife.'75 To place the term
in its proper context, Scalia cited the historic case of Greer v. Connecti-
cut'76 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act'77 for the proposition that, when
applied to wildlife, "take" describes a direct, intentional act against an
identifiable animal, rather than the indirect and unintentional actions targeted
by the "harm" regulation. 71 When considered in its proper context-rather
than in the ESA's definitional context' 79-and evaluated against Section 9's
"take" prohibition, the impropriety of the Secretary's definition becomes
abundantly clear.'
172. Id. at 2422. Though the Secretary deleted the "omission" reference in his 1981
redefinition of "harm," Scalia noted that he did so only because, as the final publication of the
rule revealed, FWS mistakenly believed that "act" was inclusive of either commissions or
omissions which were prohibited by Section 9; negating the need to expressly provide for an
"omission" in the definition of "harm." Id. (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748-50 (1981)).
173. Id.
174. Id. Scalia went on to chastise Justice O'Connor for finding that impairment of breeding
intrinsically injures an animal because "[t]o make it impossible for an animal to reproduce is to
impair its most essential physical functions and to render that animal, and its genetic material,
biologically obsolete." Id. at 2430 n. 5 (quoting O'Connor in her concurring opinion). To Scalia,
the only harm an individual animal suffers from impairment of such functions is "the psychic
harm of perceiving that it will leave this world with no issue (assuming, of course, that the
animal in question, perhaps an endangered species of slug, is capable of such painful
sentiments)." Id.
175. Id. at 2422 ("If 'take' were not elsewhere defined in the Act, none could dispute what
it means, for the term is as old as the law itself.")
176. 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896) ("[A]I1 the animals which can be taken upon the earth, in
the sea, or in the air, that is to say, wild animals, belong to those who take them.").
177. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988 ed., Supp. V) (no person may "pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill,
[or] attempt to take, capture, or kill" any migratory bird).
178. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is obvious that 'take'
in this sense-a term of art deeply embedded in the statutory and common law concerning
wildlife-describes a class of acts (not omissions) done directly and intentionally (not indirectly
and by accident) to particular animals (not populations of animals).").
179. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
180. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2423 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court treats the statute
as though Congress had directly enacted the Section 1532(19) definition as a self-executing
prohibition, and had not enacted [Section 9] at all. But [Section 9] is there, and if the terms
contained in the definitional section are susceptible of two readings, one of which comports with
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In addition to disagreeing with what he saw as the majority's failure to
keep the term "take" in its traditional context,' Scalia also took exception
with the Court's misconstruction of "harm" as it applied to the ESA.182
While the majority found that "harm" encompassed the unintentional and
indirect action of modifying habitat, Scalia sought to narrow the scope of the
term. In support of his reading of "harm," Scalia cited a legal opinion
delivered by the Solicitor of the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1981 which
concluded that "the term 'harm' should be interpreted to include only those
actions that are directed against, and likely to injure or kill, individual
wildlife."'83
To Scalia, the clearest evidence of the challenged regulation's invalidity
were the practical consequences of the regulation when considered against the
penalty provisions of the Act. Noting that a "large number of routine private
activities" such as farming, ranching, roadbuilding and construction could
subject individuals to strict-liability penalties for fortuitously injuring
protected wildlife "no matter how remote the chain of causation," Scalia
concluded that the consequences were "a result that no legislature could
reasonably be thought to have intended."'8 4
As for the legislative history of the ESA relied upon by the majority,
Scalia again reiterated his long-standing disapproval for employing such an
the standard meaning of 'take' as used in application to wildlife, and one of which does not, an
agency regulation that adopts the latter reading is necessarily unreasonable, for it reads the
defined term 'take'-the only operative term-out of the statute altogether.").
181. Indeed, the Secretary's definition of "take" was not only inconsistent with the historical
meaning of the term, but with other sections of the Act as well. For instance, Scalia notes that
Section 9(e) (1), which exempts Alaskan Indians from punishment for "taking" endangered
species "primarily for subsistence purposes," renders the "environmental modification" definition
of "harm" meaningless by obviously communicating an understanding that "take" encompasses
only direct, intentional actions directed at an individual species. In light of such contradictions,
Scalia notes that "[i]f the Act is to be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory
scheme, one in which the operative words have a consistent meaning throughout, . . . the
regulation must fall." Id. at 2425 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1661, 1667
(1995)).
182. Id. at 2424.
183. Id. at 2423-24 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490-91 (1981)) (emphasis added). Indeed, the
Solicitor's opinion, which predates the 1982 amendments, plainly concludes that the definition
of "harm" enunciated in Palila was wrong, since it encompassed actions not originally
contemplated by Congress. Id.
184. Id. at 2424. In rejecting the results of the Act as interpreted by the majority, Scalia
notes what several before him did not; that the "knowledge" requirement of the ESA requires not
that the defendant knew that what he did violated the Act, but that his actions, however innocent,
were "knowingly" taken. Thus, a hunter who shoots a protected elk in the mistaken belief that
it was a mule deer has committed a "purposeful taking" within the meaning of the ESA because
he knowingly shot at an animal whose unknown protected status rendered him guilty of a federal
crime. Id. Such an egregiously low "knowledge" requirement hardly rises to the level of a
"scienter" requirement, as it was characterized by Judge Mikva in the Sweet Home 11 case. See
Sweet Home 11, 1 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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"illegitimate" and "unreliable" tool of interpretation.' Yet, even assuming
that the Court was correct in analyzing the text relied upon by the majority,
he concluded that "here [the legislative history] shows quite the opposite of
what the Court says.' 8 6 Rejecting the Court's reliance upon broad state-
ments in Committee Reports, which he referred to as "empty flourish,"'
8 7
Scalia went on to explain the two main passages from the Act's history which
were relied upon by the majority. The first was the statement by the Senate
floor manager when the word "harm" was added to the definition of take.
There, the manager explained that the added term would "help to achieve the
purposes of the bill."'88 The second historical tidbit cited by the majority
dealt with the Senate's apparent refusal to adopt the definition of "take"
which included the "destruction, modification or curtailment of the habitat or
range.""8 9 Chiding the Court for inflating the first and belittling the
second, 9' Scalia went on to point out that the Senate and House floor
managers of the bill which became the ESA both made it abundantly clear
that the Section 9 merely prohibited direct actions against listed species, while
the land acquisition provisions of Section 5191 were to be the sole means for
alleviating habitat modification concerns on private property. 9
185. Indeed, Justice Scalia has been one of the Court's fiercest opponents against using
legislative history as a guide to statutory construction. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617-20 (1991) ("Committee Reports are [unreliable] ... not only as a
genuine indicator of congressional intent but as a safe predictor ofjudicial construction. We use
them when it is convenient, and ignore them when it is not.... [These reports do] not
necessarily say anything about what Congress as a whole thought."). In Mortier, Justice Scalia
might just as easily been referring to the Sweet Home case in his scathing criticism of legislative
history, which proves to be particularly misleading when interpreting the ESA. See, e.g., infra
notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
186. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2426-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Id. The specific statement to which Scalia refers was one which declared that "'[take'
is defined ... in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a
person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 93-307, p. 7
(1973), U.S. Code & Admin. News 1973, 2995). To Scalia, this empty statement meant little
more than "this statute means what it means all the way" and counted for little; even when made
part of the ESA itself. Id.
188. Id at 2427 (quoting the Senate floor manager).
189. Id. (citing S. 1983, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., § 3(6)(A) (1973)).
190. Id. at 2427.
191. 16 U.S.C. § 1534.
192. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2427. The court cited Senator Tunney's statement that:
[a]lthough most endangered species are threatened primarily by the destruction of their
natural habitats, a significant portion of these animals are subject to predation by man
for commercial, sport, consumption, or other purposes. The provisions of [Section
9] would prohibit the commerce in or the importation, exportation, or taking of
endangered species as evidence that Section 9 was intended only to address direct,
intentional actions against listed species.
Id. By contrast, Representative Sullivan, then the House floor manager noted that "[t]he principal
threat to animals stems from destruction of their habitat" and that Section 5 "will meet this
problem by providing finds for acquisition of critical habitat." Id. Taken together, Scalia noted
that they were "bad enough to destroy the Court's legislative-history case, since they display the
clear understanding (1) that habitat modification is separate from 'taking,' and (2) that habitat
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As for the majority's assumption that the addition of Section 10(a)
incidental take permits by Congress in the 1982 amendments "clearly"
indicated that Congress understood Section 9 to encompass "indirect takings,"
Scalia concluded that the "Court shows that it misunderstands the ques-
tion."'93 Noting that the majority's inference was reliant upon the premise
that habitat modification constituted the only form of lawful activity which
could result in the incidental taking of a listed species, he explained that there
were a number of "otherwise lawful" activities which could result in an
incidental "take."'94 Thus, the majority was incorrect in assuming that the
addition of Section 10(a) incidental take permits obviated Congressional intent
to prohibit habitat modification which "harmed" a listed species.'
V. ASSESSING THE COURT'S OPINION
The deleterious effects of the Supreme Court's opinion upon the
individual liberties of private property owners cannot be overstated.
Notwithstanding attempts by Congress to slow the ESA's erosion of property
rights by rescinding appropriations for the FWS,'96 as well as an attempt by
the Clinton administration to quell political opposition to the Act by providing
small property owners with exemption from the ESA,' 97 the Court's
decision is a disaster for private property owners, species'98 and consumers
destruction on private lands is to be remedied by public acquisition and not by making particular
unlucky landowners incur 'excessive cost to themselves."' Id. at 2427-28 (quoting Statement by
Representative Sullivan, 119 CONG. REC. 30162 (1973)).
193. Id. at 2428.
194. Id. Justice Scalia pointed to another case which involved the issuance of an incidental
take permit to fishermen who-while fishing for unprotected salmon-could inadvertently "take"
a protected species with their nets. Id. (citing Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38
F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 1994)).
195. Another error pointed out by Justice Scalia was to, at long last, explain how both the
majority and a host of courts before it (including the Palila courts) had misconstrued the Court's
holding in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In that case, Scalia explained,
the Court dealt only with Section 7 of the Act. As such, any reference to Section 9 in that case
was "utter dictum" which the Court had simply opined while assuming the validity of Section
9; not accepting or endorsing it. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2426 n.3.
196. See Budget Clause Puts 96 Proposed Listings Of Species On Hold Until End of Fiscal
1995, BNA NAT'L ENvTL. DAILY, May 2, 1995 (discussing HR 889, which rescinded $1.5
million from the Fish and Wildlife Service's $8 million 1995 appropriation for the listing of
species and critical habitat.). The purpose of this recision, according to Sen. Kay Bailey
Hutchinson (R-Texas), was to "provide a 'time out' from new listings controversy and will
provide the momentum necessary for reauthorization of the ESA." This 'short moratorium'
would prevent further erosion of private property rights and access to water sources until the
Endangered Species Act can be amended to take economic and social impacts into account." Id.
197. See, White House Eases Impact of Species Act on Small Property Owners, INSME
ENERGY, July 17, 1995 at p. 16 (explaining how the new regulation would 'essentially exempt
homeowners with five acres or less from ESA requirements on 'threatened' species, but would
not apply to species listed as 'endangered."'). When asked whether the exemptions were initiated
to improve the law or to head off impending Congressional attacks, Secretary of the Interior
Bruce Babbitt answered: "Both." Randy Lee Loftis, Endangered Species Act Under Siege; Law's
Republican Foes Say it Puts Nature Before People, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 2, 1995 at Al.
198. See infra notes 254-278 and accompanying text.
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alike. "'99 Already, the Court's decision has produced a firestorm of opposi-
tion to the Act by landowners from across the country.200 Although an
exhaustive list of all of the potential implications of the U.S. Supreme Court's
resolution of Sweet Home would be virtually impossible to construct within
the narrow confines of this article, several aspects of the decision merit
attention.
A. Rejection of Chevron
One surprising aspect of the Court's Sweet Home decision was its
election not to employ the standard of review enunciated in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.20 ' Decided in 1984,
Chevron stands for the proposition that the agencies charged with administer-
ing particular statutes should be permitted to utilize their expertise in deciding
how to interpret otherwise ambiguous Congressional intent. At its core, the
standard represents a decision by the courts to place important issues of
199. Sugg, supra note 6, at 5 (quoting Endangered Species Blueprint, NWI REsOURCE, Fall
1992, issue 3, at 1):
[T]his article strives to impress upon the reader that, by virtue of mere serendipity and
geographical accident, the ESA "can affect you if you own or plan to own property,
if you want to build on or otherwise improve your property, if you like to hunt or
fish, if you enjoy hiking, camping or even mountain biking." Even if you never
venture far beyond your rented urban apartment, "it still affects you in the form of
[higher] taxes and prices."
Indeed, Sugg's message has never been more true. Nor has it been more urgent. According to
land use attorney Craig Beam, habitat preservation measures necessitated by the ESA could take
5,411 of 7,224 acres of private agricultural land out of production in San Diego County alone.
Biberman, supra note 11, at Al. With Charles C. Mann and Mark L. Plummer estimating that
some 210 million Americans live close to at least one listed species, "a number that will grow
as the list grows," the potential consequences of the Court's decision become difficult to fathom.
MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 15, at 15.
200. Luke Popovich, a spokesman for the American Forest & Paper Association, declared
that the Court's decision "is just further evidence of why Congress has to once again take up the
Endangered Species Act, this time with a view toward fixing what is broken for landowners."
Biberman, supra note 11, at Al. In somewhat more colorful language, Marshall Kuykendall, a
rancher from Hays County, Texas declared: "It's time to cut the head off the snake." Loftis,
supra note 197, at Al.
201. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Indeed, despite a vast array of legislative history suggesting the
contrary, the Court concluded that Congress "did not unambiguously manifest its intent to adopt
[the Secretary's] view" and that "the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable." Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2416 (1995). Thus, with
its unsupported conclusion that there was no Congressional ambiguity to resolve firmly in place,
the Court declined to conduct a Chevron analysis.
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statutory construction into the hands of the "experts" charged with executing
them; with the only limitation being that the agencies act "reasonably."2 2
Rather than seize the opportunity to reaffirm the Court's policy of
deferring to agency interpretations, as the Chevron standard advocates, the
Court merely opined that its conclusion, reached independently, was
consistent with the policy behind Chevron."3 Thus, while the Court did
cite Chevron in support of its refusal to second-guess the Secretary, the Court
declined to embrace a precedent which at least one commentator predicted
would decide the case.20 4 Perhaps the Court should have accepted Dill's
invitation and confined itself to a Chevron analysis; a holding which, though
wrong, would have at least been legally defensible. As it exists, the Court's
decision is wrought with internal inconsistencies and blatant factual
inaecuracies.
B. Judicial Reshaping of the ESA
As decided, the opinions of both the Court majority and Justice
O'Connor display a stunning willingness to twist and contort the language,
structure and legislative history of the ESA to uphold an interpretation which
could not possibly have been anticipated, much less intended, by Congress in
1973.205 For instance, in response to the argument by the landowners that
202. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should
be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations 'has been consistently
followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in
the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters
subjected to agency regulations."' (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83
(1961)). The Court, in its Sweet Home opinion, referred specifically to the "degree of regulatory
expertise necessary to [the ESA's] enforcement" as further grounds for refusing to scuttle the
Secretary's definition. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2418.
203. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2418. In the final part of the Court's opinion, it declared
that the Congress had vested broad administrative and interpretive power to the Secretary, for
whom "we are especially reluctant to substitute our views of wise policy." Id. For a discussion
of how the Court has gradually turned away from the Chevron decision, see generally Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum L. Rev. 749 (1995) and Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Problems of Commitment, Non-Contractibility, and the
Proper Incentives, 44 DuKE L.J. 1133, 1134 (1995) ("Indeed, the current Supreme Court is
developing what it believes to be a highly determinate doctrine of statutory interpretation that
gives little deference to administrative agencies.").
204. See Starla K. Dill, Animal Habitats in Harm's Way: Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities For a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 25 ENVTL. L. 513, 529 (1995) (arguing that the
Court "should remain true to the Chevron doctrine and uphold the FWS regulation as a
permissible construction of an ambiguous statute.").
205. Only Justice Scalia seemed to object to the Court's conclusion that, in passing the ESA,
Congress sought to implement a regulatory regime which would jail unwitting landowners for
daring to place their needs and those of their families ahead of the interests of creatures already
teetering on the brink of extinction. To Scalia, the egregious consequences of the Act as
interpreted by the majority provided sufficient evidence to counsel against imputing such intent
to the members of Congress. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet more
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the Secretary's definition rendered them subject to criminal and civil penalties
for unintended and sometimes unforeseeable "harm" to listed species under
the "otherwise violates" provision of the Act, the Court replied that the Act
could be "read to incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate causation
and foreseeability."2 "6 This charitable type of reading by the highest court
in the land seems to imply that an unconstitutional law may be saved simply
by attributing an improbable meaning to other words in the statute. Yet even
that fails to save the ESA since prior caselaw has revealed that "ordinary
requirements of causation and foreseeability" are tossed out the courthouse
window when dealing with ESA Section 9 cases.207
To further bolster its decision that the Secretary's interpretation of
"harm" comported with constitutional requirements, the Court pointed out that
neither the respondents nor their amici had suggested that the Secretary
employed the "otherwise violates" provision with any frequency.0 8 Taken
evidence that Congress never anticipated-much less intended-for the Act to work this way is the
fact that the ESA was passed with virtually no legislative opposition. See MANN & PLUMMBR,
supra note 15, at 160 ("Not a single senator cast a ballot against the bill and only four members
of the House of Representatives did."). The extent to which and fervor with which legislation is
debated has long been considered relevant in determining legislative intent. See, e.g. McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819)
The bill for incorporating the Bank of the United States did not steal upon an
unsuspecting legislature, and pass unobserved. Its principle was completely under-
stood, and was opposed with equal zeal and ability. After being resisted, first, in the
fair and open field of debate, and afterwards, in the executive cabinet, with as much
persevering talent as any measure has ever experienced, and being supported by
arguments which convinced minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast,
it became a law. The original act was permitted to expire; but a short experience of
the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the government,
convinced those who were most prejudiced against the measure of its necessity, and
induced the passage of the present law. It would require no ordinary share of
intrepidity, to assert that a measure adopted under these circumstances, was a bold and
plain usurpation, to which the constitution gave no countenance.
Id.
Indeed, if anything, the lack of debate evinces an understanding on the part of the Senate
that "harm" was not intended to include the vastly broader conduct involved with "habitat
modification." In fact, as one ESA historian has noted, Senator Tunney offered the "harm"
amendment to the ESA on the same day that he had explained to his colleagues that land
acquisition with compensation under Section 5 of the Act was the Act's answer to the habitat
concerns of listed species. Thus, "it seems unlikely that he meant to prohibit habitat modifica-
tion" by private landowners. Ike C. Sugg, Defining 'Harm' to Wildlife, 16 NAT'L L.J., June 20,
1994, at Cl, C2. This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that "[w]hat 'harm' meant was not
even discussed at the time, nor was it debated or defined until well after the ESA was enacted."
Id
206. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2412.
207. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 166.
208. Sweet Home, 115 S.Ct. at 2412. This representation by the Court is particularly
egregious. The Court ignores the fact that respondents had been threatened with criminal
prosecution under the ESA for violating the FWS' guidelines with no mention of foreseeable
harm to listed species. Moreover, the Court's implication that none of the landowners' amici had
put the Court on notice of the FWS's misuse of the Act is demonstrably inaccurate. See, e.g.,
Amicus Curiae Brief of The Competitive Enterprise Institute in Support of Respondents, Sweet
Home, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) (No. 94-859) (providing extensive accounts of how the FWS
1996]
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to its logical conclusion, the Court's opinion seems to sanction unconstitution-
al criminal prosecutions provided they are not conducted "with any frequen-
cy." Similarly, the Court's position that "the broad purpose of the ESA
supports the Secretary's" interpretation of "harm" as including "significant
habitat modification" seems to imply that any unconstitutional transgressions
occasioned by the regulation are justified so long as the ESA's broad goals
are arguably furthered.z 9
A surprisingly ambitious-and ultimately more sticky-attempt to
manipulate the Act to comport with the Secretary's definition came from
Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion. Faced with a statement by the
Secretary that "harm" is not limited to "direct physical injury to an individual
member of the wildlife species' 21" in direct contradiction of Section 9's
prohibitive prescription against the "taking" of individual species, O'Connor
noted that "one could just as easily emphasize the word 'direct' in this
sentence as the word 'individual."' 1 Indeed, as Justice Scalia noted, one
very well could.2"2 Yet, while placing such an emphasis on direct, rather
than individual solves the problem of the definition's apparent attempt to
expand the scope of Section 9's protections to populations of species, it
simultaneously removes any semblance of a causation requirement from the
triggering of Section 9.213 In other words, any reading of the Secretary's
regulation and its accompanying comments, when considered against the rest
of the ESA, is obviously inconsistent with the ESA and thus invalid.214
The Court's opinion demonstrates an alarming proclivity for making
conclusions wholly unsupported by either the facts of the case, by ESA
caselaw, or by legislative guidance. For example, the landowners challenging
the Secretary's definition argued that the lack of debate accompanying the
amendment that added "harm" should compel a narrow interpretation of the
term.215 The Court responded that an "obviously broad word that the
routinely misuses the Act against private landowners).
209. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2413 n.19. To the Court's "broad purpose" argument, Scalia
responds plainly (and persuasively) "I thought we had renounced the vice of 'simplistically
assum[ing] that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law."' Id. at 2426
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987)).
210. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981).
211. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2419 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 2430 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
214. As for O'Connor's willingness to simultaneously argue contrary interpretations, as well
as the majority's apparent refusal to acknowledge that the Secretary's definition of "harm"
protects populations of listed species, Scalia replied: "since the Court is reading the regulation
and the statute incorrectly in other respects, it may as well introduce this novelty as well-law a
la carte." Id. at 2431.
215. Brief for Respondents at 29-30, Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) (No. 94-859)
(quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) ("The Court ought not interpret 'vague'
language to 'effect a major change' . . . without 'at least some discussion in the legislative
history.")).
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Senate went out of its way to add to an important statutory definition" was
"precisely the sort of provision that deserves a respectful reading."216
C. Revisionist History of the ESA
Few conclusions drawn by the Court in its Sweet Home decision fall
further from their mark than its finding that the permissibility of the
Secretary's definition "gains further support from the legislative history of the
statute. '217 In fact, a review of the true history of the ESA reveals remark-
ably little insight into the intentions of its creators. As Charles C. Mann and
Mark L. Plummer have demonstrated in their book Noah's Choice, a fair and
accurate reading of the Act's true legislative history reveals that "few
members of Congress had the 'foggiest idea' of what they were doing" when
they passed the ESA." 8 In fact, the ESA that exists today represents less
a conscious effort on the part of Congress to conserve imperiled species than
a calculated effort by two Washington insiders to derail what, by all accounts,
was thought to be a simple piece of "feel-good" legislation that "would let
everyone in Washington, D.C., the President included, stand up for bald
eagles and whooping cranes without any practical downside."2" 9
Frank Potter and Lee Talbot took full advantage of the fact that Congress
was distracted by fall elections when the ESA was initially being debated.
As the ESA bills marched inconspicuously through committee hearings and
back to their respective chambers for a vote, Potter and Talbot silently
"worked them over," targeting what they perceived as weaknesses in the
law.22 The two managed to manipulate not only the Act's substantive
provisions, but the preamble of the bills as well.22' Accordingly, by the
216. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2416-17.
217. Id. at 2416
218. MANN & PLIJMMER, supra note 15, at 161 (quoting Paul Lenzini, then the chief counsel
for the trade associations of the state fish and wildlife agencies). Lenzini further commented that
"[tjhere was no idea that their ox was being gored so they all voted for it." Id.
219. lI at 157 (citing John D. Ehrlichman, then the presidential assistant for domestic
affairs). The two culprits in this legislative sabotage were Frank M. Potter, Jr., then counsel for
the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, and Lee M. Talbot, then senior scientist at the
newly formed Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). Together, Potter and Talbot "intended
to slip some surprises into the legislation." Id. at 158. Indeed, Potter, who believed that it was
"too easy to say 'We'd like to do this but we can't right now,"' decided to change what he sav
as a "business as usual" mentality by teaming with Talbot "to make the mesh in the net as fine
as we could get away with." Id.
220. Id. at 159 ("I had targeted everything that was too weak and Frank had picked up
things I hadn't, so what we did from our two branches was work out a step-by-step piocess to
dill off those things."). To Talbot, working inside the Nixon administration, and Potter, working
on Capital Hill, "[t]he most important task was to get rid of all vestiges of the word practicable"
because without any appeal to practicability, federal agencies would no longer have an exit. Id.
221. Id. With Potter and Talbot's revisions, the goal of the Act became to protect "the
ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species of wildlife depend." By altering the
purpose of the Act to cover "ecosystems," the preamble "in effect committed the entire federal
government to a mandatory program of habitat protection." Id. at 160. Boasted Potter: "That's
where we really stuck it to them." Id. The actions of Potter and Talbot with regard to
19961
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time the bill passed through the Hill and other agencies and reached the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the bill had evolved to the point
that its original drafter commented "there were probably not more than four
of us who understood its ramifications." '222
Potter and Talbot's scheme worked exactly as planned. When the House
and Senate met to forge a single mutually acceptable version of what would
become the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the changes made by Potter and
Talbot easily managed to "escape attention from the kingpins of 'business as
usual. ,'I223
Considered in its proper historical context, the "legislative history" of the
ESA-replete with histrionic statements by legislators, all striving to best
their contemporaries in voicing their fervent support for species conserva-
tion-reveals much about behind-the-scenes political maneuvering but little
about the intent of Congress in enacting the ESA. More importantly, the true
history of the ESA offers none of the support claimed by the Court in its
Sweet Home opinion. Instead, it further demonstrates what one ESA
commentator has observed: "Defenders of the ESA are rewriting history so
as to avoid rewriting the law. 224
D. Incidental "Take" Permits-Where's the Carrot?
In concluding that the Secretary's challenged regulation was a permissible
construction of Congressional intent, the Court noted that Congress in 1982
authorized the Secretary to issue permits for takings that would otherwise be
prohibited by Section 9.225 Because such permits could only be granted
upon a finding by the Secretary that "such taking is incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity, '226 the Court
surreptitiously inserting "ecosystems" clears up the confusion expressed by one ESA expert who
observed that, in light of the presence of the word "ecosystems" in the Act: "It is curious,
therefore, that Congress paid so little attention to the ecosystem side of the equation in the basic
structure of the law." Ruhl, supra note 101, at 580.
222. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 15, at 160. The original drafter, Charles E. "Chip"
Bohlen, explained further that "[lt was only sometime after its passage that people realized its
implications. We certainly didn't advertise it. Why should we have? It was not our intent to ring
alarm bells." Id.
223. Id. Thus, "[wihile everyone was swooning over the idea of protecting endangered
species, few members of Congress paid attention to the text of the legislation they extolled...
Id. at 158.
224. Ike C. Sugg, Rats, Lies, And The GAO; A Critique of the General Accounting Office
Report on the Role of the Endangered Species Act in the California Fires of 1993, CEI PRESS
RELEASE (Competitive Enters. Inst., Wash. D.C.) Aug. 1994, at 14.
225. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407,
2414 (1995).
226. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1) (B).
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reasoned that Congress understood Section 9 to prohibit indirect as -well as
deliberate takings.227
Amendment of the ESA to include an exemption process for private
property landowners followed closely on the heels of the Palila decisions and
grew out of a multi-year conflict between a proposed development project and
two species of endangered butterflies.22 Rather than legislatively overrul-
ing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' overbroad interpretation of Section
9, Congress instead added Section 10(a) which was intended to address "the
concerns of private landowners who are faced with having otherwise lawful
actions... prevented by the Section 9 prohibitions against taking." '229
Pursuant to Section 10(a), private landowners who wish to develop their land
must first petition for an incidental take permit by submitting to the Secretary
a habitat conservation plan (HCP) listing the effects such development will
have, and what steps the landowner will take to mitigate those effects." °
If the Secretary makes a series of findings indicating that the proposed taking
will be incidental to an otherwise lawful activity and that the taking will not
227. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2414. But see supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text
(detailing Scalia's explanation for the majority's misinterpretation). See also supra note 81
(explaining that the amendment was due to a reluctance on the part of Congress to endure the
political fallout which would result from clearing up an obviously overbroad interpretation, rather
than to a conscious decision by Congress to adopt the Palila decisions).
228. See Thornton, supra note 165, at 605. Section 10(a) was modeled on the San Bruno
Mountain Conservation Plan, which involved development at San Bruno Mountain on the San
Francisco Peninsula in Northern California. Id. at 621. Two weeks after the local board of
supervisors required the landowner the landowners to dedicate two-thirds of the mountain as a
park, the "FWS proposed to list the calliope silverspot butterfly as an endangered species and to
designate critical habitat on the mountain, which overlapped all of the remaining areas on the
mountain designated for development." Id. at 621-22. After two years of intensive negotiation,
the landowners were finally persuaded into accepting and financing a habitat conservation plan
for the entire mountain to protect approximately 90 percent of the habitat of the Mission Blue
and Calliope Silverspot butterflies. Id. at 622.
229. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 567, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982).
230. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2) (A) (i)-(iv). Such plan must specify:
(i) the impact which will likely result from such taking:
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the
funding that will be available to implement such steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why
such alternatives are not being utilized; and
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or
appropriate for purposes of the plan. Id.
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appreciably reduce a specie's chances for survival,2 3' a permit may be
issued.232
Predictably lauded by ESA proponents as a "way of telling the private
property owner that protection of the landscape can be arranged in a way that
makes sense, 233 Section 10(a) incidental permits have utterly failed to
mitigate the ESA's onerous impact on private property owners.234 As of
the beginning of 1994, pitifully few HCPs had been completed and only
twenty-one incidental take permits had been issued in Section 10(a)'s first
twelve years of existence.235 In the few cases where HCPs have been
successfully implemented, they have done so only at exorbitant cost to the
private property owners charged with the duty of developing the plans.236
In areas where HCPs have ultimately failed to realize completion, the
experience has left the landowners involved with a bitter taste in their
mouths. In Austin, Texas, for example, the Balcones Canyonlands Conserva-
tion Plan (BCCP), once heralded by Secretary Babbitt as the "flagship" of the
Clinton administration's efforts to reconcile the concerns of the environmental
231. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2) (B) (i)-(v). Before the Secretary may issue a permit, he must
make the following five findings:
(i) the taking will be incidental;
(ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the
imp acts of such taking;
(iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the project will be provided;
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery
of the species in the wild; and
(v) the measures, if any required by the Secretary will be met.
If the Secretary finds all of the aforementioned facts to exist, and if "he has received such other
assurances as he may require that the plan will be implemented, the Secretary shall issue the
permit." Id.
232. More likely than not, however, the permit will never be issued, but will instead founder
in the "qegotiations" which seldom produce agreement. See infra notes 234-38 and accompanying
text.
233. Babbitt, supra note 5, at 363.
234. Notably, and perhaps expectedly, the government does not have nearly the trouble
obtaining an exemption from the ESA. For while "[u]nder section 10 it is the applicant's duty
to create an acceptable habitat conservation plan, however long it takes," the burden under
Section 7(o) permits is "shifted to the authorizing agency and the FWS, and they must normally
conclude formal consultations within 90 days" with "no provision for public participation in the
Section 7 assessment process." Farrier, supra note 103, at 378 (emphasis added). Thus, private
property owners, subject only to the "take" provisions of Section 9, find it infinitely more
difficult to obtain incidental take permits than federal agencies, who are charged with the
affirmative obligation to ensure that none of their activities are likely to "jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species. . ." under Section 7. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2). As one
critic has noted: "Why should the federal government have a process available for its activities
that is not afforded to individuals and entities with purely private needs? It should not." Somach,
supra note 21, at 804.
235. Farrier, supra note 103, at 376.
236. Under the Coachella Valley RHCP, for example, approximately 15% of the remaining
habitat for the Coachella Valley fringe-toed lizard was set aside in the form of three lizard
preserves in Riverside County, California. The three preserves were purchased at a cost of $25
million, which was primarily funded by "development mitigation fees" assessed against
landowners. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act:
Pushing the Legal Limits of Species Protection, 44 Sw. L.J. 1393, 1405 (1991).
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and development communities, ended in failure at the hands of voters
unwilling to shoulder their share of the $130 million price tag.237 Along
the way, the process managed to stir up plenty of anger and distrust among
the Texas citizenry.23
Similarly, efforts in San Diego, California to implement a Multiple
Species Conservation Program (MSCP) have engendered fierce opposition
from landowners who liken their cause to the .American Revolution.239 The
MSCP, an ambitious plan which aims to preserve more than 164,000 acres
of habitat in San Diego County, is one of the nation's first attempts to shift
habitat conservation planning to the regional, rather than species-by-species
level.24 Based largely upon the "ecosystem management" concept of
species conservation long-touted by Secretary Babbitt,2 41 the MSCP, and
programs like it, seek to "preserve open space that supports an array of
species before they reach the critical list. 2 42  Whatever its objective, the
237. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 15, at 202-03. As a result of the BCCP's failure
at the hands of voters in Travis County, Texas, the BCCP dissolved into a fragmented preserve
system with funds collected under a successful bond election in Austin. Id.
238. One angry rancher named Bobby Curry proclaimed: "If the bird wants to come here,
fine. But I don't need the federal government to tell me how to run my ranch ... These
government people want to dictate to us. It's all about control. It's communism." Scott Harper,
Endangered: Species or Rights? Battle Lines are Being Drawn in the Debate Over the
Endangered Species Act, THE HousToN POST, Aug. 28, 1994, at Al.
239. Explains Poway property owner John Pavin: "There's no difference between us
standing up today for our property and the colonists in 1776 standing up to the king." Lori
Weisberg, This Land is My Land! Cry of Property Rights Fuels Rural Fight, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., October 15, 1995, at Al. The MSCP is but one of three programs being developed in San
Diego which will combine to cover nearly 1 million acres. LaRue et al., supra note 13, at A27.
Of the more than 160,000 acres targeted by the San Diego MSCP, which will seek to protect
nearly 100 "sensitive" species, including the threatened California gnatcatcher, "about half of
them [are] already in public ownership." Id. Much as he did with the failed attempt in Texas,
Babbitt touts the San Diego MSCP as a "national model." Id.
240. Emmet Pierce, Many Fight to Preserve Land Rights: Rural property Owners Gain
Clout Against Plan, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 23, 1995, at B1. Observed San Diego Mayor
Susan Golding: "This is the first time this has ever been done in the country. . . . Id. It's
important that it be done the right way because if it fails I doubt that it will be attempted
elsewhere."
241. Babbitt's fondness for "ecosystem management" is understandable. Explains one species
proponent, "[a]nyone [in the environmental community] who's critical of this program should
think twice, because this is a way to get de facto protection for unlisted species in an anti-
environmental political atmosphere." Deborah Schoch, Hammering Out a Truce in Orange
County's Gnatcatcher Wars; Wildlife Activists, Developers Work Together on a Plan That Could
Set Aside 39,000 Acres, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995, at Al (quoting Dennis Murphy, director of
Stanford University's Center for Conservation Biology and a designer of the project's approach)
(emphasis added).
242. La Rue et al., supra note 13, at A27. For a criticism of Babbitt's "ecosystem
management" policy and the fallacies upon which it is based, see Ike C. Sugg, Property Wrongs,
CEI UPDATE (Competitive Enters. Inst., Wash. D.C.) Nov. 1993, at I ("Defenders of property
rights be forewarned, ecosystem management is the new rhetoric for regulating everything."). For
a contrary view, see James Drozdowski, Saving the Endangered Species Act: The Case for a
Biodiversity Approach to ESA Conservation Efforts, 45 CASE W. RES. 553, 554 (1995) (arguing
that "[c]onservation should concentrate on ecosystems and biodiversity as a whole, and ... the
current piecemeal approach to conservation should be abandoned). Note that the title of Mr.
Drozdowski's article, which focuses on saving the Act rather than species, seems to support the
observation of Ike Sugg that: "It has become all too obvious. Some people are more interested
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MSCP process promises to meet the same dismal fate as its more limited
HCP relative: death at the hands of its land-owning victims.
The potential impact of the Sweet Home decision on the San Diego
MSCP has not been lost on ESA proponents, who see the decision for what
it is: judicial carte blanche to engage in national land use planning.24 Nor
has the decision escaped the notice of San Diego property owners,244 who
now face the unsavory prospect of providing shelter for the public's wildlife
free of charge.245
The failure of habitat conservation planning, whether directed at
individual species or ecosystems, is the predictable result of a fundamentally
unfair process that "forces a false choice between economic activity and the
preservation of biodiversity."246 Indeed, Babbitt's contentions notwithstand-
ing,"' the incidental take permit process of Section 10(a) of the Act all to
often leaves landowners feeling that the "government... seems like they are
after us instead of for us."248 It is a process woefully devoid of carrots but
in saving the Endangered Species Act than they are in saving endangered species." Ike Sugg,
Specious Claims of Species Statute?, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1993, at E4.
243. Indeed, Jim Whalen, co-chairman of the Alliance for Habitat Conservation, noted that
the decision "suggests that the amount of land that is going to be needed to make conservation
programs such as the MSCP work is going to be bigger." La Rue et al., supra note 13, at A27
(emphasis added). For readers who may wonder why the Supreme Court's decision-which merely
examined the propriety of the Secretary's definition of harm-even impliedly means that the
amount of land required for the conservation of endangered species will increase, the answer is
simply that, under the Court's apparent carte blanche of authority to regulate private land for the
benefit of endangered species, all apparent checks on the authority of land use planners have been
removed.
244. "I just have a deep sense of hopelessness .... I invested my after-tax dollars in this
property, hoping I could do something with it someday, and that's not going to happen. I'm just
wondering where private property rights fit in with [the Sweet Home] decision." La Rue, et al.,
supra note 13, at A27 (quoting Jerry McCaw, a small landowner in San Diego's North County).
245. See Sugg, supra note 6. Sugg notes that habitat conservation plans are primarily funded
by the very property owners who are harmed by them, and concludes that "[t]hus, private
property owners are forced to pay for the public's interest in endangered species." Id. at 38.
246. Craig Manson, Natural Communities Conservation Planning: California's New
Ecosystem Approach to Biodiversity, 24 ENVTL. L. 603, 604 (1994).
247. See, e.g., Babbitt, supra note 5.
248. Pierce, supra note 240, at B2 (quoting Sharon Berg, a Ramona-area beekeeper). In the
same article, East County Supervisor Dianne Jacob admits that opposition to the MSCP, which
has rendered the plan "up in the air," stemmed from the failure of planners to seek the opinions
of the small landowners whose lands were affected by the plan. "The little landowners were
never part of the equation." Id. Similarly, Mann and Plummer explain the failure of the Balcones
Canyonlands Conservation Plan (BCCP):
In laying out the means for saving all the species in Austin's backyard, the scientists,
as required by law, paid no attention to the practicability of following their recom-
mendations. In other words, all the ecological fieldwork, computer simulations, and
geographic information systems behind the Austin plan ignored the values of the
people whose lives it would change. It foundered for that very reason.
MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 15, at 177.
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armed to the teeth with a vast array of sticks.249 Considering how "the
most critical actors on the stage of conservation""25 are treated under the
Section 10(a) permit process, the paucity of successful HCP programs comes
as little surprise. In fact, it is a wonder that any HCP anywhere has ever
been implemented.25 Yet, this section of the ESA-a section that Congress
chose merely as a politically palatable alternative to restoring common sense
and original intent to the Act252-became a "pillar" upon which the Su-
preme Court saw fit to rest its Sweet Home decision.
E. Shoot, Shovel & Shut Up
One of the most tragic consequences of the Supreme Court's decision in
Babbitt v. Sweet Home will be to further pit private property owners against
the threatened and endangered species "protected" by the ESA. Indeed, the
decision is likely to provide private property owners with even more incentive
to ensure that endangered species are never found on their property.253
Dubbed the "Shoot, Shovel & Shut Up" solution by landowners in the Pacific
Northwest,2 4 the perverse incentives of the ESA promise to dramatically
worsen under the Court's holding in Sweet Home. By saddling private
249. See Farrier, supra note 103, at 309 ("Effective biodiversity conservation policy requires
a combination of carrots and sticks. Regulations must set appropriate landuse contours. At the
same time, incentives should be delivered to landholders in the form of stewardship payments
for positive land management that would be sensitive to the conservation of biodiversity... ").
See also John C. Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under the Endangered Species
Act, 24 ENvTL. L. 501, 574-78 (1994) (suggesting a number of ways species conservation could
be accomplished more effectively under an incentive-based system rather than the ESA's
command-and-control mechanisms). In fact, the only "carrot" under the ESA is an agreement by
the Secretary not to beat the landowner with the ESA's painful assortment of sticks! This fact
stands in stark contrast to the admonition of one ESA proponent who notes "[i]f you look at any
environmental legislation, you have to have both the carrot and the stick." Hugh Dellios, Nature
vs. Human Nature: Incentives May Be Solution, CHIC. TRIB., June 26, 1995, at 1.
250. Manson, supra note 246, at 604. Indeed, not only does the Section 10(a) process ignore
the property rights of the landowners upon whose land the species exist, but it actually requires
those same landowners to forfeit all such rights.
251. Or, perhaps it is to be expected. For, although Thornton points out that "the
development community is growing increasingly frustrated with the length of time required to
resolve the endangered species conflicts through the HCP process and... the growing
acknowledgment of the inequity of imposing the cost of endangered species conservation largely
on the shoulders of development interests and their customers," the regulatory reach of the ESA,
particularly under the Court's Sweet Home decision, affords them no other choice. Thornton,
supra note 165, at 607.
252. See sources cited supra note 81.
253. See sources cited supra note 12.
254. See, e.g., Vivoli, supra note 12, at Fl. Ike Sugg credits environmental scholar R.J.
Smith as being "largely responsible for having brought the negative incentive phenomenon to
light." Sugg, supra note 6, at 45 (citing Robert J. Smith, The Endangered Species Act: Saving
Species or Stopping Growth?, REG., Winter 1992, at 83). Whatever its origins, the negative
incentives of the ESA have engendered hostility towards not only listed species, but against ESA
supporters as well. At a public hearing to address the property rights concerns of landowners in
Stockton, California, a teacher, Laurette Rodgers, and her fourth-grade class were "booed and
heckled" when they attempted to talk about their award-winning project to protect freshwater
shrimp. Loftis, supra note 197, at Al.
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property owners with the duty to manage their land for the benefit of listed
species without compensation, courts and FWS agency personnel have
managed to engender sentiments on the part of landowners which one critic
likens to those of the colonists who were forced to quarter English soldiers
before the American Revolution.255
Since long before the Sweet Home decision, the Fish and Wildlife Service
has consistently implemented the Act in a manner that creates enemies of
conservation instead of conservationists. A well known example of the Act's
onerous impact on private property owners is the story of Benjamin Cone of
Greensboro, North Carolina. Formerly a conservation-minded landowner,
Cone used to manage his property primarily for the benefit of wildlife.255
His conservation efforts, which included controlled bums and preservation of
old-growth, were apparently appreciated by his intended beneficiaries; by
1991, his property sheltered twenty-nine endangered red cockaded woodpeck-
ers.257 For his efforts, the Fish and Wildlife Service prohibited Cone from
modifying his property within a half mile radius of each bird colony."
Mr. Cone, a Harvard MBA, quickly learned his lesson and began massive
clear-cutting in areas where the woodpeckers had not yet "taken over." 259
Another enemy of FWS "conservation" practices is Cindy Domenigoni
of Riverside County, California. After purposely leaving her fields fallow
every four years, Domenigoni's land became attractive habitat for meadow-
larks and sparrows.26 Unfortunately, the field also attracted the Stephans'
kangaroo rat; a listed species. Because of the rat's presence, Domenigoni was
precluded from ploughing the section of her land which she had allowed to
go fallow.26" ' The rat's presence, which was due to Domenigoni's responsi-
ble stewardship, ended up costing her $400,000 in lost income and direct
255. See Tom Bethell, Species Logic: How Enviros Kill Endangered Species, THE AM.
SPECTATOR, Aug. 1995, at 20. Richard Stroup of the Political Economy Research Center in
Montana notes that if the army today had the power to billet soldiers that Fish and Wildlife has
to billet animals, "we could expect to see soldiers feared, despised and perhaps even ambushed,
as listed species reportedly are today." Indeed, as Ike Sugg has explained, "If urban residents
were required to house the homeless the way rural residents have been required to house
endangered species, perhaps they would better understand the moral and economic outrage that
has catalyzed the property rights movement." Home, Sweet Home, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995,
at A18. Apparently, even some FWS personnel would agree that Sugg's analogy lends itself well
to the ESA. Notes Assistant Interior Secretary for the Fish and Wildlife Service: "Like people,
wildlife need a home and shelter and a place to rear their young." Adrianne Flynn and Steve
Yozwiak, Landmark Ruling Ends Term; Landowners Lose in Habitat Fight, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
June 30, 1995, at Al.
256. Bethell, supra note 255.
257. Id.
258. Id. The circle has since been reduced to a quarter mile. Id. FWS no doubt "gave him
back" his own property to demonstrate how "flexible" and "user-friendly" the ESA is.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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expenses.262  The rodent nearly cost her a lot more than that. Despite a
steadfast insistence to the contrary by government officials and ESA
supporters,263 the ESA nearly cost the Domenigoni family-as well as their
neighbors-their very lives.
At 11:30 p.m. on October 26, 1993, high winds downed a powerline in
Riverside County, California.264 Sparks from the downing caused a fire and
25,000 acres and 29 homes were subsequently consumed by the flames.
265
Not coincidentally, 19 of the 29 homes which were destroyed were in habitat
designated as "preserve study areas" for the Stephans' kangaroo rat.26
Unfortunately for those 19 homeowners, the federal government had
prohibited the "disking" of soil to clear firebreaks in preserve study areas, as
well as virtually all other forms of land use.267 As a result, the fires swept
through the landscape, free from any man-made barriers.
Not all of the landowners in Riverside County suffered the loss of their
homes. When the fire came raging over a nearby hilltop on the Dom-
enigoni's property around 1 a.m., her neighbor Michael Rowe "cut through
the Domenigoni's fence, jumped on his tractor and disked a firebreak to
protect his property. 268  As a result, Rowe saved his property as his
neighbors' burned. Though the General Accounting Office has since claimed
that a "shift in the direction of the wind," and not Mr. Rowe's disking saved
his property, Rowe categorically denies the allegation.269
262. Despite the fact that the Fish and Wildlife Service threatened the Domenigonis with
a $50,000 fine and/or a year in prison for each rat disturbed, her taxes on the property were not
abated. Id.
263. Sharon L. Newsome, Vice President of Resources Conservation attheNational Wildlife
Federation, claimed that "[tihe Endangered Species Act did not cause the fire, did not cause the
destruction of those 29 homes and did not prevent citizens, acting in good faith, from doing
whatever it took to save their property." Sharon L. Newsome, Scapegoating the Endangered
Species Act, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1994, at A20.
264. Sugg, supra note 224, at 1.
265. Id.
266. Id. The "k-rat," as it is commonly called, was listed as an endangered species in 1988,
even though it is only one of three other species in the same genus (with 56 subspecies) in
California, and 22 closely related species with hundreds of subspecies elsewhere in the U.S. Id.
at n.4.
267. "Disking," a mechanical process whereby an implement usually pulled and powered
by a tractor cuts into and overturns the soil, is widely believed by fire experts to be the most
effective means of fire prevention. Noted Richard Wilson, Director of the California Department
of Forestry and Fire Protection, in an interview with Sugg, "disking is the best tool ... it's just
a simple fact. If you mineralize the soil you eliminate the carrier of the fire ... mowing doesn't
work." Id. at 11.
268. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
269. Notes Rowe, "the wind was blowing right at me." Id. Notably, the FWS has never
pursued any ESA violations against Rowe for the disking he did in violation of FWS policy. The
government could hardly excuse his actions as being in defense of life if they truly believe that
the wind had shifted the fire away from his property. It would not be the first time a landowner
faced prosecution under the ESA for protecting his life. See, e.g., Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d
1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989) (rancher who shot grizzly bear was
precluded from arguing defense of own life where rancher put self in danger to protect livestock).
1996]
41
Vivoli: "Harm"ing Individual Liberty: Assessing the U.S. Supreme Court's
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Not surprisingly, supporters of the ESA deny that the Act played any role
in the Southern California fires. As Sharon Newsome of the National
Wildlife Federation has argued, "residents of Riverside County were not
'prohibited' from clearing firebreaks in the Stephan's kangaroo rat habitat"
and "it is not true... that the service threatened to sanction the Riverside
County fire department if it recommended clearing flammable brush.""27
Unfortunately for Ms. Newsome, and others who would deny the Act's
contribution to the tragedy, both the Riverside County fire department and
citizens of Riverside County have produced letters from the FWS stating
otherwise. 2
7
The citizens of Riverside are not the only people to have lost their homes
in the interest of protecting species; nor did they suffer the gravest of injuries.
The Malibu firestorm in 1993, which claimed the lives of 3 people and
injured 111 others, was reportedly exacerbated by a lack of prescribed bums
in the area in order to protect the coast homed lizard.272 As one commenta-
tor noted about the incident, "[t]hose who put lizards first are not alone.
While most environmentalists advance the laudable goals of fighting pollution
and preserving unique natural habitats, some ecofreaks and animal rights
advocates jeopardize human health and safety to ensure the comfort and well-
being of flora and fauna."273
It would appear as though the ESA has come a long way from the days
when it merely pitted landowners against species for their property rights.
Today the act pits them against species for their very lives and the lives of
their families. As the foregoing examples amply demonstrate, the ESA not
only fails to encourage wise species stewardship on private lands, it threatens
the very lives of the landowners upon whose lands house endangered species
choose to live with a punishment banned in several states: the death penalty.
The predictable result for landowners like Domenigoni is that "[w]e are no
270. Newsome, supra note 263, at A20.
271. Sugg, supra note 224, Appendix III and V. One letter, from Brooks Harper, Office
Supervisor for Southern California Field Station of the FWS to Paul Smith, Fire Captain
Specialist of the Riverside County Fire Department notes that "the Service would like to
emphasize that the County could be considered a responsible party if any Stephan's kangaroo rat
(Dipodomys stehpens) was taken subsequently to issuance of a public weed abatement notice."
The letter goes on to threaten that "any disking within the historic range and in potential habitat
of this species puts the County and land owner at risk of violating Section 9 of the Endangered
Species Act. Section 9 prohibits the 'taking' of a listed species without necessary authorization.
Civil and criminal penalties can be levied against responsible parties." Id. at Appendix III.
Similarly, Michael Rowe received a letter from the same office cautioning him that the presence
of species listed under the ESA and Migratory Bird Treaty Act meant that "should you take
endangered species or migratory birds you are liable for both State and Federal prosecution." As
an added threat, the letter cautioned that "[t]he Service is forwarding this information to other
appropriate agencies for their information and review." Id. at Appendix V.
272. Deroy Murdock, Fires, the Horned Lizard and Hindsight, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Nov. 12, 1993, at B7. See also Betsy Carpenter, This Land is My Land, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Mar. 14, 1994, at 67 (quoting Yshmael Garcia of California, whose house burned after the
FWS precluded him from clearing a fire break on his property: "Now, I'm homeless, thanks to
a bunch of bureaucrats and so-called environmentalists.").
273. Murdock, supra note 272, at B7.
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longer pleased to see an eagle, or a hawk or a previously unnoticed flower on
our land. Sights like these now cause us great concern that our livelihood
and our heritage will be stripped away from us." '274
The Court's resolution of Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon, which now places upon the unwitting landowner an
affirmative obligation to provide habitat for the public's wildlife free of
charge, will drastically worsen the already untenable relationship between
man and beast under the current ESA. For, as one ESA commentator has
noted, it is one thing to require some landowners to bear the burden of
providing such public goods; "it is a very different thing when people can be
incarcerated for not providing that habitat."275 Likewise, it is one thing to
force landowners to choose between species conservation and their property
rights; it is quite another to force them to choose between species and their
lives. Indeed, such an ultimatum is no choice at all.
VI. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTuRE
Without a doubt, the most severe, and indeed ironic consequence of the
Court's Sweet Home decision is the dramatic backlash it has caused against
the ESA itself.276 A piece of legislation once believed to be impervious to
legislative challenge,277 the ESA has itself become endangered as citizens
and legislators alike call for an end to its twenty-plus year reign. Perhaps the
Court's decision, and the severity of its impact, have finally provided the
"point of leverage" Donald Barry predicted would be necessary for moving
the "immovable object" the Act had become."7 If recent developments in
Congress and the statements flowing therefrom are any indication of the fate
of the ESA, supporters of the Act are in for a big disappointment. On the
other hand, if there is anything to the wishful thoughts of Secretary of the
Interior Bruce Babbitt, perhaps the ESA will emerge from the Sweet Home
controversy substantially unscathed. At present, there appears to be three
possible courses for the ESA to follow; legislative repeal of the Sweet Home
decision, drastic modification of the way the Act is administered, or a move
in the right direction-a market-driven system of incentives for successful
species conservation.
A. Legislative Repeal?
Shortly before the court handed down its Sweet Home decision, Senator
Slade Gorton, R-Wash, chairman of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee
274. Bethell, supra note 255, at 20.
275. Sugg, supra note 6, at 16.
276. See sources cited supra note 13.
277. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 60, at 590 (describing a legislative attack on the ESA as
"a suicidal assault up a vertical cliff, without ropes or pitons.").
278. Id. at 598-603.
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on Interior and related agencies proposed his ESA-reauthorization bill, S. 768,
which ESA supporters immediately decried as "radical."279 Gorton's bill,
which would give the Secretary of the Interior "almost unlimited power to
decide what-if anything-should be done to try and save an endangered
species," has since faltered amongst revelations that the bill was actually
authored by two business coalitions."'
With the release of the Sweet Home decision, the drive to change the Act
has been given new life.28" ' Perhaps the most dramatic and, as of yet, the
most successful attempt to change the ESA has been H.R. 2275.282 Spon-
sored by Don Young, R-Alaska, and introduced on September 7, 1995, H.R.
2275 is the result of Young's earlier promise to create legislation "designed
to make private landowners part of the solution in preserving species."2 3
Recognizing the impact that the ESA has traditionally had on private
landowners, Young promised to change the Act to "make private landowners
part of the solution in preserving species.2 84
H.R. 2275 was immediately opposed by ESA supporters, who claim that,
had the bill been passed instead of the ESA in 1973, "the bald eagle and
many other species probably would not be with us today., 285 Notwithstand-
279. Jim Waltman, director of the refuges and wildlife program at The Wilderness Society,
criticizes Gorton's "radical" bill as implying that "Congress never intended to protect habitats
when it passed ESA." High Court Upholds Agency Assessment of 'Harm' Under Species Act,
supra note 9, at 15. According to Waltman, the Court's decision means that "Gorton is wrong
and the Act does protect habitat." Id.
280. Erin Kelly, Endangered Species Act May Itselfbe Endangered, GANNET NEWS SERV.,
May 8, 1995. Under his bill, Gorton explained, "'[o]nce a decision is made to declare a species
endangered, there won't be any automatic consequences other than you can't hunt or trap the
animal,"' Id. According to David Wilcove, a biologist with the Environmental Defense Fund,
Gorton's bill, which gives the Secretary of the Interior broad discretion in implementing the Act,
puts far too much control in the hands of one person: "If Bruce Babbitt is the Secretary ... it's
likely that a lot of species are going to be protected .... But if Jim Watt is Secretary, nothing
will be protected." Loftis, supra note 147, at IA. In light of the problems surrounding the
controversial drafting of Gorton's bill, Senator Kempthome has drafted a similar replacement.
See Senator Kempthorne to Introduce Bill to Gut Endangered Species Act, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
October 25, 1995.
281. Promising that the Court's decision would not be the last word on the matter, Senate
Energy Committee Chairman Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), proclaimed "[ijt aint over till it's
over." High Court Upholds Agency Assessment of 'Harm' Under Species Act, supra note 9, at
15. Referring to the door left open by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion for Congress
to "revisit the issue," Murkowski stated "[i]t's my hope Congress will walk through that door
with appropriate legislation reforming the [ESA]. We need to make sure property rights are not
left out of the equation." Id. See also supra notes 9 & 13.
282. H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
283. Don Young, Some Reforms Are Not 'Repeals', WASH. TIMEs, July 27, 1995, at F5. In
language that "will be very clear," which will ensure that "courts will not have to spend any
more time worrying about this fundamental issue," Young promised to amend the ESA to
accomplish conservation by "encouraging landowners to protect the habitat that is essential for
the recovery of these species." Id.
284. Id.
285. Conservation Leaders From Congress, Interior and Citizen Groups Decry Bill To
'Repeal' Endangered Species Act, U.S. NEWswim, Oct. 11, 1995 (quoting Rodger Schlickeisen,
president of Defenders of Wildlife). According to Schlickeisen, H.R. 2275 essentially "repeals
the ESA, makes protection on private lands voluntary, and even prohibits protection of
[Vol. 32
44
California Western Law Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss2/4
BABBITT V. SWEET HOME
ing such opposition, H.R. 2275, dubbed the "Endangered Species Conserva-
tion and Management Act of 1995," managed to withstand the scrutiny of the
House Resources Committee, where it passed by a strong bipartisan majority
of 27-17.286
Though H.R. 2275 contains several mechanisms designed to make the
Act's drastic impacts on private landowners less onerous, there are several
aspects of the bill which suggest that its opponents dramatically overstate its
effects. Indeed, the bill hardly threatens to "rip away the guts" of the
ESA.287 In fact, several provisions of the bill promise to do very little to
ease the Act's regulatory burden on private property owners; allowing instead
for business-as-usual at the FWS.
For example, Title I of the bill, entitled "Private Property Rights and
Voluntary Incentives for Private Property Owners," proffers the not-so-novel
idea that "the federal government shall not take an agency action affecting
privately owned property or nonfederally owned property under this act which
results in diminishment of value of any portion of that property by 20 percent
or more unless compensation is offered in accordance with this section."288
Notably, the section fails to explain by whose figures the "20 percent"
diminishment of value is to be computed. Given the disingenuous practices
of the FWS in the past, one can hardly anticipate any FWS audit revealing
a 20 percent reduction in value.289 Moreover, Section D of the same title
provides that "the agency may negotiate with that owner to reach agreement
endangered species on public lands where it would interfere with the profits of special interests."
Id. Rep. Jim Saxton (R-N.J.) accused the Republican leadership of helping "the special interests
come in the dark of night to rip away the guts of our environmental laws." Id. Jim Jontz, a
former member of Congress and current director of the Endangered Species Coalition, a
consortium of environmental groups, predicted that the bill "is so extreme that it may sink under
its own weight." Id.
286. Jim Hansen, Endangered Species Reform Passes Resources Committee With Key
Amendments, CONG. PRESS RELEASES, Oct. 18, 1995. Among the amendments offered by Hansen
was a requirement that listing decisions include an analysis of the economic and social effects
a listing may have at the same time a species listing is being considered. Id.
287. Conservation Leaders From Congress, Interior and Citizen Groups Decry Bill To
'Repeal' Endangered Species Act, supra note 285 (quoting Rodger Schlickeisen, President of
Defenders of Wildlife).
288. H.R. 2275, supra note 282, at Title I, § 101(A).
289. Forjust one example of the questionable enforcement practices of the FWS, see sources
cited supra note 70. Even if the landowner's figures were used to compute diminutions in value,
one can hardly doubt that the FWS would dispute the figures, forcing the landowner to assert his
or her rights in court; something painfully few can afford to do. Moreover, Title I, § 101(C)
provides that "an owner seeking compensation under this section shall make a written request for
compensation to the agency implementing the agency action." H.R. 2275, supra note 282, at Title
I, § 101(C). Anyone who has had the misfortune of dealing with a federal agency can only
imagine the Byzantine array of bureaucratic red tape that will be involved in submitting such a
request.
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on the amount of the compensation and their terms of any agreement for
payment.
290
Other provisions of H.R. 2275 promise to do similarly little to "fix" the
ESA. For instance, Title I, § 103 of the bill provides that "the Secretary
may... provide a grant to a non-federal person... for the purpose of
conserving preserving, or improving habitat for any species" listed under the
ESA.29' However, before making any such grants, the Secretary must make
a finding that (1) "the property for which the grant is provided contains
habitat that significantly contributes to the protection of the population of the
species," that (2) "the property has been managed for species protection for
a period of time that has been sufficient to significantly contribute to the
protection of the population of the species, and (3) the management of the
habitat advances the interest of species protection."292 Just what constitutes
"significantly contributing to the protection of populations of species" is left
undefined, as is how much time it takes to "sufficiently contribute to that
protection." In short, this language contained in H.R. 2275 offers little more
than lip service towards mitigating the Act's impact on private property
owners.
H.R. 2275 also promises to improve the "scientific integrity of listing
decisions and procedures."'2 93 Among other groundbreaking proposals, this
section of the bill promises to "improve the validity and credibility of
decisions" by basing listings on, of all things, "credible science."294 This
section also plans to add such procedural "safeguards" as "peer review,"
"greater state involvement" and the "monitoring of species."29 How these
largely cosmetic alterations will mend a clearly ineffective Act is left to the
imagination of readers.
For all of H.R. 2275's controversy, and its "new" methods of incorporat-
ing "economic incentives" for landowners, few have bothered to note that the
current ESA already has a provision for funding habitat conservation in a
manner that comports with the Constitution's 5th Amendment takings
prohibition. Indeed, compliance with the Constitution was the express intent
290. H.R. 2275, supra note 282, at Title I, § 10 1(D). Given the nature of the conduct of the
FWS discussed infra, it hardly seems necessary to expound on the potential for abuse contained
within this particular provision. It is sufficient to note that the concept of "good faith" efforts to
negotiate are often remarkably different when dealing with an agency the likes of the FWS.
Indeed, H.R. 2275 promises to promote new lows in agency negotiation by providing that "any
payment made under this section to an owner" is to be "made from the annual appropriation of
the agency that took the agency action." Id. at Title I, § 101(H). Thus, an owner seeking
compensation for deleterious agency action will be in the unenviable position of having to wrestle
his money out of the agency's own pocket. Given the inherent conflicts of interest that would
likely result under the "new" ESA, H.R 2275, Title VIII's "Funding of Conservation Measures"
amounts to little more than shallow mockery.
291. Id. at Title I, § 103(11) (A).
292. Id. at Title I, § 103 (emphasis added).
293. Id. at Title III.
294. Id. at Title III, § 301(a).
295. Id. at Title III, §§ 302, 305 and 306, respectively.
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of Congress when it created the land acquisition measures embodied in
Section 5 of the Act.296 Thus, the problem has not been that the Act fails
to offer a constitutionally palatable method of conserving species. Rather, the
problem has been that federal agencies have declined to use it; choosing
instead to foist the costs of conserving species upon the backs of landowners
through the misuse of Section 9's "take" prohibition.
Notably, H-R. 2275 does provide for a "redefinition" of "take" under the
ESA.2 97 However, the "new" definition leaves the "old" one largely intact
and represents anything but a legislative repeal of the Sweet Home definition.
Deceptively entitled "Removing Punitive Disincentives," Section 203(b)
would "redefine" "harm" as follows: "the term 'harm' means to take a direct
action against any member of an endangered species of fish or wildlife that
actually injures of kills a member of the species. 298
As should be obvious to readers, the "redefinition of 'harm"' offered by
H.R. 2275 leaves the definition debated in Sweet Home largely intact. There
is no still no reference in the definition to any "intent" required on the part
of the person who would be accused of "taking" a listed species. Nor does
the "new" definition correct the Sweet Home definition's incorrect applicabili-
ty to "populations" of listed species by expressly stating that only "individu-
al" species are protected by the Section 9 "anti-take" provision. Thus, under
H.R. 2275, the Court's misinterpretation of "take" would remain largely
unaffected, in a seemingly after-the-fact ratification of previous judicial
interpretations.
Given the remarkably benign effect that H.R. 2275 would have on the
current ESA, one wonders whether all of the chest-beating by its proponents
is not more than a little disingenuous. 299
Perhaps the most revealing provision of H.R. 2275 is its amendment of
the ESA to provide that "nothing in the Act shall be construed to limit any
right to compensation that exists under the constitution.""3 ' That Congress
actually saw the need to amend the ESA to comport with the Constitution
demonstrates that the Act's power has become such that the only way out of
its regulatory reach is to pull the plug on this regulatory behemoth.
296. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)&(b).
297. H.R. 2275, supra note 282, at Title II, § 202.
298. Id. at Title II, § 202(B).
299. In fact, H.R. 2275 offers a panoply of caveats and loopholes for the creative
environmental litigator. Given their ingenious history, it should take them all of a year to
eviscerate the token homage paid to landowners in H.R. 2275 through environmental litigation.
300. Id. at Title I, § 101(K) (1). Note, however, that no court has ever awarded compensa-
tion to any person whose land was "taken" under the Endangered Species Act. Thus, this
provision of the bill effectively says "nothing in this act shall be construed to limit that which
does not exist!"
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B. A Kinder, Gentler Act?
With citizens and legislators alike calling for either dramatic amendment
or outright repeal of the ESA, Bruce Babbitt, one of the Act's most ardent
apologists is striving to convince anyone who will listen that the Act is not,
in fact, broken. Moreover, according to Secretary Babbitt, "[t]here isn't the
slightest bit of evidence the federal Endangered Species Act will be
repealed." ''
Secretary Babbitt has made no secret of the high regard in which he
holds the Endangered Species Act. A self-described religious person who
sees "in the landscape the handiwork of God," Babbitt has been the Act's
most tireless defender." 2 In his efforts to save the current ESA, Babbitt
has sought to draw attention to the Clinton administration's decision to
exempt small property owners from the Act's strictures.3"3 He has also
traveled across the country applauding efforts by local agencies and
individuals to engage in cooperative arrangements which provide for
environmental conservation, proclaiming that such "success stories" should
mitigate against substantial revision of the ESA." 4 Interestingly, it appears
301. Bruce Babbitt, Q&A With Members of the San Diego Union-Tribune's editorial board,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 5, 1995, at G5. If Secretary Babbitt truly believes this assertion,
one wonders why he saw it necessary to take to the pages of the Washington Post, where he
accused Republicans of conspiring to "strangle the Endangered Species Act." Bruce Babbitt,
Springtime for Polluters; Behind Closed Doors, the Republicans Are Trashing the Environment,
WASH. PoST, Oct. 22, 1995, at C2. There, he accused the Republicans of surreptitiously using
appropriations riders and the like to bury environmental laws. If that is their goal, Babbitt wrote,
"the least they could do is work in the open, using the constitutional process that we all learned
about in high school civics: Draft a bill, hold hearings, issue statements on what you have done,
argue it out in the media, engage in open floor debate and hold a distinct vote on the agenda for
which they may be held accountable." Id. Interestingly, Secretary Babbitt did not offer Frank
Potter and Lee Talbot as models of how to "work out in the open."
302. Loftis, supra note 197, at IA.
303. White House Eases Impact of Species Act on Small Property Owners, INSIDE ENERGY
WrrH FEDERAL LANDS, July 17, 1995, at 16. The day after the White House announcement,
Babbitt appeared before the Senate Environment subcommittee on drinking water, fisheries and
wildlife to plead for consideration by the committee of the efforts of the White House to lessen
the Act's impacts in the hope that such efforts would stymie the efforts of lawmakers to change
the laws.
304. See, e.g., Interior Secretary Babbitt and Potlach Chairman Richards Announce
Conservation Plan for Endangered Species, BusrNEss WIRE, October 26, 1995. Proclaimed
Babbitt, "[i]n this time of passionate discussion about the future of the Endangered Species Act,
[the Potlach plan to set-aside habitat for the red cockaded woodpecker] is a true success story
of a public-private partnership forged to achieve compatible goals." Calling the agreement with
Potlach a "welcome partnership which sets a precedent for the protection and management of this
endangered species," Babbitt championed the efforts of Potlach, which, he claimed, went "beyond
what others have done to address the needs and survival of the red-cockaded woodpecker." Id.
According to U.S. FWS Southeast Regional director Noreen K. Clough, the Potlach agreement
demonstrates that "HCPs are a win-win proposition for people and for wildlife." Id. above.
Notably, the agreement has not yet resulted in the actual issuance of an "incidental take permit"
and the plan has yet to complete the public comment period and FWS approval. See also Peter
Rafle, Clinton Administration announces Salmon Recovery Agreement; Columbia River
Restoration Funding Will Not Be Capped, U.S. NEwSwmrE, October 24, 1995 (agreeing to
increase funding for salmon restoration in the Columbia River without incorporating provisions
that would have waived important sections of the Northwest Power Act and the Endangered
48
California Western Law Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss2/4
BABBITT V. SWEET HOME
that Babbitt has again resorted to one of his favorite tactics for saving the
Act; the strategic delisting of species to show that the "Act works."30 5
Secretary Babbitt has remained steadfast in his insistence that "the ESA
is not the problem."3 6  Rather, Babbitt contends that the failures of the
ESA thus far stem from the fact that "the people who have been charged with
administering the ESA have not explored imaginative and creative ways to
arrange possibilities to give effect to a wonderful, expansive Act."3 7 Thus,
Babbitt maintains that "innovation within the terms of the ESA" is a much
better approach than a legislative solution to the problems which have
plagued this legislative behemoth.30 8
To achieve this "innovation," Babbitt has sought to change the Act's
complexion by marching around the nation "heralding" local agencies and
individuals who voluntarily place their necks in the ESA's regulatory noose.
By putting a "smiley face" on this true legislative monster, Babbitt hopes to
convince the masses that the true secret to conserving endangered species lies
within the existing Act, and that only he knows how to unlock its true
potential.
Fortunately, many have pointed out that Babbitt and other ESA
proponents are plainly wrong.309 The failure of the ESA is due not to a
lack of funding, nor to a failure in implementation. Rather, as one ESA
commentator has noted, "the seeds of regulatory failure are sewn into the
very structure of the ESA and cannot be explained away as a failure of
implementation."3 ' In fact, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 fails
because it operates under the untenable premise that species conservation is
a goal superior to all others, which requires unprecedented-and uncompen-
sated-sacrifice from those whose lands are unfortunate enough to house
endangered species.3 ' Ironically, it is the ESA's inherent power and
Species Act). Thus, in addition to declining to utilize the Act's more stringent provisions, the
Clinton administration appears set on bribing local officials into continued compliance with the
ESA with federal funds.
305. See, e.g., Tom Kenworthy, 'A Symbol of Hope; Rising Peregrine Population Prompts
Move To End Falcon's Endangered Species Listing, WASH. POST, July 1, 1995, at Al. Not
surprisingly, Secretary Babbitt was on hand to issue an announcement after he visited a nest site
atop the Bank of New York. Babbitt took advantage of the opportunity to "demonstrate the
virtues of the [Endangered Species Act]." Id. See also Sugg, supra note 242, at E4 (quoting a
spokesman for the national Marine Fisheries Service who, shortly after the delisting of the
California gray whale, remarked "we think taking off the whale will allow the Act to continue.").
306. Babbitt, supra note 5, at 366.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See generally Sugg, supra note 6; Farrier, supra note 103; and Gidari, supra note 37.
310. Farrier, supra note 103. Even Michael Bean, one of the Act's more notable supporters,
admits that it "is clear to me after close to 20 years of trying to make the [ESA] work is
that ... on private lands at least, we don't have very much to show for our efforts, other than
a lot of political headaches." Shoot, shovel, shut up, WASH. TIMEs, June 13, 1995, at A20.
311. Notably, no landowner has ever received compensation for the deleterious effects of
ESA-related regulation of her property.
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absolutism which will ultimately cause its demise." In creating the ESA,
Congress brought to life a modem day Frankenstein whose power it has been
forced to wrestle with ever since its conception." 3 As a result, no amount
of cheerleading by Secretary Babbitt can justify the ESA in its current form.
C. Market-Driven System of Incentives?
Any meaningful reform of the ESA must come to grips with the role that
private property owners invariably play in species conservation. For in the
end, "it will be those people who will make a difference. Not laws. Not
government policies. And not our wishful thinking.""3 4 The Endangered
Species Act of 1973 not only fails to incorporate these actors on the stage of
conservation, it specifically precludes any such consideration.3?1 5  This
exclusion ignores the fact that "there is a general consensus among conserva-
tion biologists that active human management is crucial to successful
conservation."" More importantly, it engenders unnecessary hostility
between the landowners and species which depend upon the habitat
involved.317 Thus, the challenge facing ESA reformers is how best to
"devise ways to modify the behavior of private landholders."3 "8
As this Note has sought to make clear, the traditional method of
facilitating species conservation has been through the "command and control"
regulatory strictures of the ESA. As one observer has noted, however,
"[r]egulation is only effective when used in tandem with incentive-based
ongoing management and restoration of ecosystems."3" 9 Moreover, while
regulation depends on the collateral use of incentives, "it is theoretically
possible for countries to achieve their objectives solely by providing
landowners with incentives to manage their land in a way that is sympathetic
312. See Sugg, supra note 6, at 5.
313. "Thus," notes Sugg, "the question at hand is not unlike the question an agnostic might
pose to theologians: Is God's omnipotence such that He could create a rock too heavy for Him
to lift? Similarly, the environmentalist must wrestle with the possibility that the ESA is too
powerful to be upheld." Id.
314. Stephan R. Edwards, Sustainable Conservation By and For the People, in RICHARD
LITTELL, ENDANGERED AND OTHER PROTECTED SPECIES: FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION 18
(1992).
315. Note that no section of the ESA provides for any consideration of any other factor
other than the interests of species listed under the Act.
316. Farrier, supra note 103, at 324.
317. See supra notes 254-276 and accompanying text.
318. See Farrier, supra note 103, at 326. Encouraging the participation of these landowners
is essential, Farrier notes, because "it is inadequate to restrict the process of conserving
biodiversity to protected areas of public land, such as national parks and wildlife refges, which
have been set aside for this purpose. Biodiversity must be integrated with private land
management." Id. at 306.
319. Id. at 307.
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to biodiversity conservation.""32 Thus, the challenge should lie in how to
facilitate successful species conservation with as little governmental
interference as possible.32'
One method of facilitating species conservation whose effectiveness has
been amply demonstrated is the utilization of markets. For instance, in 1992,
Messrs Charles C. Mann and Mark L. Plummer noted the example of the
Pacific Yew.322 Once treated as a weed, the Pacific Yew was traditionally
burned and slashed to the ground.32 3 Now, however, the species is flourish-
ing as never before. Another ESA "success story?" Hardly. In fact, the tree
was never placed on the endangered species list. If it had, it would likely be
extinct today.
The successful comeback of the Pacific Yew owes its remarkable
recovery to taxol, a chemical contained within the bark, needles and roots of
the tree.3" 4 When it was discovered that taxol was a potential treatment for
ovarian cancer, no bureaucrat from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had to
tell people to conserve the plant; people rushed to plant seedlings, and indeed,
conducted research into how they could speed the growth of the tree. The
end result? More Pacific Yews than you can shake a stick at. In fact, as
Messrs Mann and Plummer observed, "the recovery occurred by means so far
from the Fish and Wildlife Service that one cannot help wondering if
orthodox governmental plans to save biodiversity are asking the right
questions, let alone providing the right answers." 325
Another well documented account of how markets can successfully
facilitate the conservation of biodiversity is the plight of the African elephant.
320. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, this situation mirrors the fact that "command and control"
mechanisms for regulating the economy are dependent upon a certain degree of freedom in the
marketplace while a purely free market can freely exist without any "command and control"
mechanisms. The similarity between markets and ecosystems have not gone completely
unnoticed by experts. See, e.g., MICHAEL ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMY AS ECosYsTEi (Henry Holt
and Co.) (arguing that an economy is like an evolving ecosystem, which should be treated
accordingly).
321. This goal of maximizing individual liberty-unlike the regulatory growth-control
tradition of the ESA-is infinitely more compatible with the historical value Americans place on
individual autonomy. As Professor Bernard H. Siegan has noted, "[a]bsent a vital and pressing
justification, growth control lacks equitable or philosophical roots in a legal system essentially
dedicated to maximizing liberty." Bernard H. Siegan, Conserving and Developing the Land, 27
SAN DIEGo L. REV. 279, 284 (1990). In order to establish that "vital and pressing" problems
exist which justify regulation to alleviate environmental problems, Siegan would put the burden
of proof where it belongs; on those who would subvert the rights of the individual. It would then
be required that such challengers demonstrate that the situation had reached an "unusually
adverse level," requiring the application of growth restrictions. Under the current ESA, the
burden of proof has been placed squarely on the individual landowner to demonstrate that their
otherwise lawful actions will not threaten an endangered species. As Professor Siegan notes, this
situation is diametrically opposed to traditional value Americans place on individual liberty. For
species conservation to succeed in a nation whose very existence is predicated upon the liberty
interests of the individual, this fundamental flaw under the Act must be addressed.
322. Mann & Plummer, supra note 12, at 47.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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On October 16, 1989, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) voted to list the African elephant
on Appendix I.326 Listing a species as Appendix I is the functional equiva-
lent of listing a species as "endangered" under the ESA.327 Once a species
is so listed, nations which are parties to CITES are banned from commercial-
ly trading in the species. 28
The listing of the African elephant as an Appendix I species came after
hundreds of thousands of elephants had been slaughtered in the previous ten
years, presumably for their ivory tusks.329 By prohibiting member nations
from trading in elephant products, it was believed, the seemingly insatiable
demand for ivory could be eliminated, allowing for successful conservation
of the pachyderms.33  What trade ban advocates-like their American
counterparts who created the ESA-failed to anticipate, however, were the
real-life consequences of their actions in adversely shaping the relationship
between humans and endangered species.
Not all countries in Africa had experienced decreasing numbers of
elephants prior to the trade ban in 1989. In fact, between 1970 and 1989,
while the population of elephants in Kenya fell from 167,000 to only 16,000,
the number of elephants in Zimbabwe actually increased from fewer than
40,000 to over 50,000.331 The disparity between these two seemingly
similar nations stemmed directly from their respective conservation practic-
es."'32 While Zimbabwe made their elephants valuable resources for their
citizens by giving them communal property rights to the elephants, Kenya
deprived its citizens of any such benefits by allowing their elephants to
remain in "common ownership."333  Thus, to citizens of Zimbabwe,
elephants became a significant source of revenue through hunting and tourist
fees, while Kenyans continued a relationship of mutual fear, as roaming
elephants razed crops and trampled citizens.334
Fortunately for Kenyans, David Western, newly-appointed director of the
Kenya Wildlife Service, understands these dynamics. Notes Western, "I have
to create an atmosphere in which the Kenya Wildlife Service is seen as the
custodian of natural resources but also, when it comes to people's land, as
partners in trying to figure out how wildlife can be maintained in the interest
326. Ike Sugg & Urse Kreuter, Elephants and Ivory: Lessons from the Trade Ban 14 (1994).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 15.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 16.
332. See generally id.; Randy T. Simmons & Urse P. Kreuter, Herd Mentality: Banning
Ivory Sales is no Way to Save the Elephant, 50 POLICY REVIEW 46-49 (1989).
333. Id.
334. Sugg & Krueter, supra note 326, at 16-17.
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of the landowner."335 To achieve this atmosphere, Western plans to reintro-
duce trophy hunting for some species of game, with profits going to the local
landowners.336 Western also plans to combat poaching by encouraging
villagers to lead safaris on private lands now outside state-sanctioned
reserves. 337  Thus, he reasons, villagers would then '!protect them as an
economic investment.,
338
Much like CITES, the ESA not only deprives endangered species of
objective value by precluding their stewards from benefitting from their
presence, it effectively turns listed species into costly liabilities for their hosts
by depriving landowners of the use of their land. Thus, it should come as
little surprise that listing on the endangered species list has become a lifetime
appointment.339 It should also come as no surprise that "more than one tree
hugger has inadvertently embraced the corpse of a northern spotted owl
staked to the object of his affection.""34  Faced with the dismal fate of
being forced to raise the public's wildlife without compensation, landowners
have traditionally had little reason to participate in conserving wildlife.
Indeed, even Congress has noted that landowners are "understandably
unwilling to ... [conserve species] at excessive cost to themselves.""34
Particularly in the wake of the Sweet Home decision, private property
owners have unambiguously manifested an unwillingness to continue
shouldering the burden of conserving America's endangered species. Indeed,
that the situation has gone on as long as it has is a disturbing commentary on
the modem interpretation of the 5th Amendment's proscription against
uncompensated takings, which "was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be bome by the public as a whole.
342
Reformation of the ESA, and conservation of biological diversity as a
whole, must incorporate the private property owners whose participation is
so critical to successful conservation. The recent success of environmental-
335. David Graham, Kenya's Western Partner, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 6, 1994, El
at E4.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. (emphasis added). Notably, Western's appointment as service director followed the
tenure of Richard Leakey, whose demand that game not be regarded as the property of the
villagers engendered hate and distrust among the community. Though Western credits Leakey
for drawing needed international attention to the wildlife crisis in Kenya, he criticizes him for
only seeing to it that changes occurred "inside the parks and in the headquarters of Nairobi"
while "nothing much was changing on the ground" among Africans. Id.
339. For an exhaustive discussion of how and why the ESA fails to recover listed species,
see Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, its Effects on Man
and Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1993); Sugg, supra note 242, at E4; MANN &
PLUMMER, supra noe 15, at 239-47; and Ike C. Sugg, To Save an Endangered Species, Own One,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1992, at 1.
340. Vivoli, supra note 12, at A20.
341. See Statement of Rep. Sullivan, supra note 116.
342. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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minded stores like "The Nature Company" and others3 3 suggest both that
there is a demand for endangered species and that, given the proper
mechanisms, people are willing to pay for their conservation.344 The
traditional obstacle to the successful implementation of market mechanisms
has been the abhorrence of markets by many in the environmental communi-
ty345 and their insistence that endangered species remain res nullius, or, the
property of no one.346 Thus, as Ike Sugg has explained, if wildlife belongs
to all citizens in common, then "the presumption is that there is little reason
to pay for something that 'we' already own. 347
Using positive economic incentives to encourage the active participation
of landowners in producing environmental goods is not unprecedented in this
country's political history. Indeed, several such programs are currently under
way.348  However, the current state of the federal budget deficit makes it
unlikely that an expansion of such incentives will be forthcoming. Moreover,
as long as a large percentage of the public continues to maintain the
traditionally held belief that species are a public good which private property
owners have no "right" to denigrate by developing their habitat, successful
endangered species conservation will remain a distant dream, forever out of
touch.
Thus, the only way to ensure the continued viability of our Nation's
biodiversity is to get the government out of the endangered species business
altogether and allow private landowners to maximize the "incalculable value"
of endangered species through the direct realization of the financial benefits
of conserving wildlife. Only then, when individuals are permitted to
343. The Wild Nature Emporium in Geneva, Illinois, for example, "has a wide array of toys
and gift items for all ages. For instance, in the fossil comer, there are small ones for children
priced at $3 as well as teeth of the prehistoric shark, carcharodon megalodon ($18-$40), and ice
age bison skulls ($275) for adults." S.R. Carroll, Things from Nature, for Young and Old, CHIC.
TRIB., Oct. 29, 1995, at 5. Also, "sponsorship kits are available for adopting endangered species
like humpback whales and wolves." Id.
344. Indeed, the demonstrated willingness of a large number of citizens to contribute
millions of dollars towards environmental groups that engage in litigation on species' behalf tends
to mitigate against arguments that the public is unwilling to pay for conservation. The problem,
more likely, lies in the fact that under the current ESA, they are unable, and indeed expressly
prohibited from doing so.
345. Explains Ike Sugg: "Unfortunately, the environmental logic of game ranching, and its
successes, will not be enough to save it from the wrath of the high priests of preservationism,
for whom the commercial utilization of wildlife is heretical. Their antipathy to markets reinforces
one's suspicion that certain preservationists are more anti-capitalism than they are pro-
environment." Sugg, supra note 339, at 1. Indeed, noted one economist at the Department of the
Interior, "What exasperates me is the reluctance to try [the market] approach even when it is
practical." Mann & Plummer, supra note 12, at 51.
346. See generally, MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW
(1977), Notably, the government has itself subscribed to this proposition to absolve itself from
liability for damages done by both its wildlife and its wildlife policies. See, e.g., Sickman v.
United States, 184 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1950).
347. Sugg, supra note 6, at 11.
348. See, e.g., Farrier, supra note 103, at 324-40 (1995) (the Conservation Reserve Program
at pp. 329-34; the Wetlands Reserve Program at pp. 334-37; and the Sodbuster and Swampbuster
programs at pp. 337-40).
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objectively demonstrate the value of biodiversity, will wildlife become a truly
sustainable resource.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to Secretary Babbitt's baseless assertion that the "ESA's not the
problem," the overwhelming weight of the evidence suggests otherwise.
Indeed, in its first twenty-two years of existence, the ESA has proven an
unmitigated failure for all parties concerned. The U.S. Supreme Court's
decision, while initially lauded by ESA proponents, appears poised to
drastically effect the future of the Act by making explicit what has remained
implicit for years. Specifically, the Court's decision demonstrates that read
literally, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 is beyond reproach. For, on
its face the Act is predicated upon the untenable premise that the preservation
of threatened and endangered species preempts all other sources of law,
including the United States Constitution.
No longer can environmental advocates continue to force unwitting
landowners to shoulder the burden of the public's interest in wildlife. Indeed,
in a nation uniquely devoted to the maximization of individual liberty, the
subversion of such liberties for anything less than the most pressing of health
and safety issues is inimical to the fundamental ideals upon which our system
of government rests.
Thus, Mr. Babbitt, the ESA very much is the problem. As noted above,
the "seeds of regulatory failure are sewn into the very structure of the ESA."
It is a badly flawed piece of legislation which no amount of legislative
tinkering can rehabilitate. Far from saving the ESA, the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon demonstrates that the Endangered Species Act must be
repealed, lest we all become involuntary servants of the public's interest in
wildlife.
Michael Vivoli*
* The author wishes to thank the editorial staff of the California Western Law Re-
view/International Law Journal for their diligent efforts on behalf of this comment and Ike C.
Sugg, from whose unparalleled work on the subject the author benefited immeasurably. All
mistakes herein, are, of course, the sole responsibility of the author.
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